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THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF DEFENDANT'S
SAFETY RULES IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION
John M. Winters *
I. INTRODUCTION
One facet of the oft-mentioned complexity of modern industrial
society is the ever-increasing number of safety rules and regula-
tions whereby Congress and state legislatures, federal and state
administrative agencies, the various trade associations, and indi-
vidual private companies seek to provide for safer handling of
the dangerous instrumentalities with which the employees of in-
dustry must work. It is this latter group of safety regulations,
namely those adopted by the individual companies with which
this article is primarily concerned, although the other types of
rules will be used for comparison purposes.'
As the cases cited throughout this article will indicate, both
plaintiffs and defendants have attempted to introduce safety rules
into evidence, each at times seeking to use them to prove his own
due care, while at other times each tries to use them to show
the negligence of the other. With the general acceptance of the
principle of multiple admissibility whereby courts will admit evi-
• B.S. (Commerce) 1952, Creighton University; LL.B. 1957, Creighton
University.
1 The leading cases favoring admissibility of company rules are Dublin,
Wicklow & Wexford Ry. v. Slattery, L.R. 3 App. Cas. 1155 H.L. (1878);
Bryan v. Southern Pac. Co., 79 Ariz. 253, 286 P.2d 761 (1955); Diester v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 99 Kan. 525, 162 P. 282 (1917); Stevens v.
Boston Elevated Ry., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338 (1904); Cincinnati St.
Ry. v. Altemeier, 60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899). Contra: Hoffman
v. Cedar Rapids & M. C. Ry., 157 Iowa 655, 139 N.W. 165 (1912);
Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71 Minn. 438, 74 N.W. 166 (1898); Fries v.
Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956). See the annotations
to the Bryan case, supra, 50 A.L.R. 2d 16 (1956) and to the Deister
case, supra. L.R.A. 1917c 793. See also BALDWIN, PERSONAL IN-
JURIES § 258 (2d ed. 1909); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 17.3,
at 981 (1956); MORRIS, TORTS 119 (1953); 3 SHERMAN AND RED-
FIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 506 (Rev. ed. Zipp, 1941); 6 THOMPSON,
NEGLIGENCE § 7829 (2d ed. 1905); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 282,
§ 461, at 501 (3d ed. 1940); [Morris, Admissions and the Negligence
Issue,] 29 Texas L. Rev. 407, 412, 432 (1951); 38 Am. Jur. Negligence
§ 3121 (Supp. 1958).
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dence for one purpose even if it is not admissible for another,2
it is possible to discuss separately the various considerations given
the rules at different times for different purposes. However, be-
fore any detailed analysis can be undertaken, certain general com-
ments are appropriate.
As used herein, "safety rules" may be defined as those written
rules and regulations adopted by management with the intention
of governing its subordinates so as to minimize the chances of harm
resulting from the otherwise possible choice of less safe methods
of operation. Most of the case law and prior writing involving
safety rules concerns common carriers, especially railroads and
streetcar companies. The obviously greater contact these com-
panies have with the general public and the resulting larger volume
of litigation involving them accounts for such emphasis, although
cases cited later in this paper will include among others those
involving department stores, independent contractors, airlines, and
municipalities. It is hoped that the coverage of this article will
make it applicable to all safety rules as well as to those of the
mentioned groups.
A preliminary distinction must be recognized between the em-
ployee who is liable himself, the employer who is liable under the
doctrine of the respondeat superior, and the employer who is di-
rectly liable. The employer is the defendant in the typical case,
presumably because of its greater ability to pay and the conse-
quently unsympathetic attitude of the jury. However, it will be
necessary to keep in mind the dictinction between the servant or
employee on the one hand, and the master, employer, or company
on the other; and the distinction between the two bases of the
latters' liability. It will become apparent that under any particular
theory of the admissibility of company rules as evidence, the proper
persons must be made parties and there must be appropriate allega-
tions in the pleadings to support the theory.3
Another distinction which must be emphasized can be under-
stood by considering the company rule at two different times.
At sometime prior to the controversy in question, the company,
through whatever process it may have adopted, makes the man-
agerial determination that a given rule or group of rules should
be in force, and causes this information to be disseminated. In
2 Standard Oil Co. v. Allen, 121 N.E. 329 (Ind. App. 1918); McCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 59 (1954); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 13 (3d ed. 1940).
3 But see Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Bell, 24 Tex.Civ. App. 579, 58 S.W.
614 (1900) to the effect that the rules themselves need not be pleaded.
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a large company this determination may involve a number of
steps, but they will have been completed before the accident cre-
ating the cause of action.
Next the rule must be examined at the time of the accident.
While the printed copy of the rule does represent some proof of
a prior managerial determination, in a certain sense the rule is
more than the printed paper. An accidental destruction of the
paper upon which the rule is written might affect knowledge or
dissemination of the rule, yet the rule could continue to be opera-
tive. Possibly the rules could be looked upon as being a part of
the contractual relationship between the company and its em-
ployee, in that, as will be mentioned later,4 the employment con-
tract creates a contractual duty of the employee to obey reasonable
rules. The obedience to the rules is a part of the consideration
for the contract. This duty is more personal to the parties than
the duty created by a statute, but it is a legal duty nonetheless.
Moreover, while the rules cannot govern the employees' actions
entirely, there is a certain ordering of the employees' action as
a result. The employee who violates them may be subject to
disciplinary action, including loss of employment.5 Therefore, his
actions and those of his fellow employees will, within the scope
of the rules, tend to conform to the pattern the rules seek to estab-
lish.
Whether the rules as thus analyzed can be said to "exist" or
not is the problem of the philosopher, but existence can be assumed
for present purposes. The rules in question will have some status
following their adoption which will continue at least until the
controversy arises. This distinction between the adoption of a
rule and its continuing existence will have a bearing on much of
the remaining discussion.
It will now be possible to discuss each of the various bases
upon which the admission of safety rules has been attempted.
While the emphasis will be upon the direct relationship between
rules and the general standard of care, consideration will also be
given to related problems such as showing knowledge of danger,
feasibility of safeguards, contributory negligence, and reliance. In
addition, the duty to make rules under certain circumstances will
be noted and the use of rules to prove what happened will be
considered. It should be emphasized at this point that the major
4 See note 139 infra.
5 See generally CCH Lab. L. Rep. 4095.10 on the effect of a rule viola-
tion under a union contract. See also United Fireworks Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 252 F.2d 428 (6 Cir. 1958).
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part of this article concerns controversies between third persons
as plaintiffs and the employee or employer, or both, as defendants.
Those cases involving suits by employees against employers or
against fellow employees are reserved for brief consideration in
a separate section because of the peculiar considerations which
differentiate them.
II. SPECIAL PURPOSES FOR ADMISSION
A. To PROVE KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER
This element of the substantive law of negligence concerns
those dangerous situations in which a defendant knows, or should
know, of the danger and is bound to govern his actions accordingly.0
The theory is that a person who knows or should know of a danger
is under a duty to be more careful than the one who, through no
fault of his own, lacks such knowledge. Generally, a plaintiff may
prove actual knowledge by affirmative evidence that the defendant
actually knew of prior accidents,7 had been warned by someone
of the danger,8 or had made a prior effort to correct the situation.,
Where offered to show prior effort and, therefore, knowledge,
company safety rules have been usually held to be admissible. "'
6 On knowledge of danger generally see Bryan v. Southern Pac. Co.,
79 Ariz. 253, 286 P.2d 761 (1955); 2 HARPER AND JAM ES, TORTS
§ 16.15, 907-18 (1956); MORRIS, TORTS 95 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS
129-35 (2d ed. 1955).
7 1 SHERMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 59 (Rev. ed. Zipp,
1941); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 252, 254, at 70 (3d ed. 1940);
[Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negligence Cases], 61 Harv. L. Rev.
205 (1948).
8 Ft. Worth & Denver City Ry. v. Looney, 241 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951).
9 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 282, 283 (3d ed. 1940). This section
mentions company rules as an example of taking precautions.
10 Bryan v. Southern Pac. Co., 79 Ariz. 253, 286 P.2d 761 (1955); Atlantic
Consol. St. Ry. v. Bates, 103 Ga. 333, 30 S.E. 41 (1898); Chicago,
St. P. & K. C. Ry. v. Ryan, 165 I1 88, 46 N.E. 208 (1896); Dunham
v. Des Moines Ry., 240 Iowa 421, 35 N.W.2d 578 (1949); Hines v. Chicago,
M., & St. P. Ry., 196 Iowa 109, 194 N.W. 188 (1923); Derosier v. New
England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 81 N.H. 451, 130 A. 145 (1925)
(dictum); Texas Traction Co. v. Hanson, 143 S.W. 214 (Tex.Civ.App.
1911). in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889,
91 N.W. 880 (1902) a ruling requiring the locking of turntables was
used "to bring home to the defendant knowledge" of the danger in
leaving them unlocked, but in Fries v. Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80
N.W.2d 171 (1956) rules were kept out without discussion of knowl-
edge of danger.
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Of course, notice of danger must be in issue and must either be
specified in the plaintiff's offer of proof or the court must assume
that this was the purpose of offering the evidence. The safety
rule would be admissible against the employee and, vicariously,
against his employer to show that the employee knew of the danger,
or, if he has failed in his duty of knowing promulgated rules, that
he should have known of the danger. When lack of knowledge of
the rules is not the fault of the employee, they are not admissible
against him, although as we shall see later," they may be ad-
missible against the employer to prove the employer's own negli-
gence in failing to promulgate proper safety rules.
While the courts have failed to specify any special types of
rules which may be admitted for this purpose, an analysis of the
cases indicates what general types are admissible. The rule under
consideration should single out a specific physical location, or at
least a type of situation, sufficiently unique to indicate that the
company requires special precautions under certain circumstances
or in certain places. These rules may fix a degree of care varying
from the normal or they may call for particular action. The for-
mer type is exemplified by a rule stating that engineers should use
extreme caution at a designated curve on the tracks. As will be
discussed later, the standard of care in a negligence action is "ordi-
nary care",12 not extreme caution; yet when a situation is known
to be fraught with dangers, a greater degree of care is called for
than in the normal, less dangerous situations. 13 The company in
singling out this location tells the employees to notice the danger,
so the employee is required to be more careful. Thus, in the ex-
ample concerning the care required at a particular curve, the
mere knowledge of this rule imparts to the engineer a knowledge
that the named curve is dangerous.
The other type of rule used to show knowledge sets out a par-
ticular mode of action for a particular location or situation. In
Bryan v. Southern Pacific Company,1 4 the defendant's rule pro-
vided that where public crossings were not protected by a watch-
man or gates, a member of the crew had to go into the crossing
before dropping or kicking cars across such crossings. A railroad
car running in this manner without an engine hit the automolbile
11 See note 36 infra.
12 See note 39 infra.
13 See PROSSER, TORTS 147 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HARPER AND JAMES,
TORTS § 16.5 at 915 (1956).
14 Bryan v. Southern Pac. Co., 79 Ariz. 253, 286 P.2d 761 (1955).
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that plaintiff was in, causing the injury complained of. The court
admitted the company rule on the ground that it indicated defend-
ant "realized or should have realized" its conduct involved un-
reasonable risk.
In these dangerous situation cases, two things must be proven:
that the situation is dangerous, and that the defendant knows of
the danger. Proof of the danger by the company rule is possible
under the theory of its being an admission of the company, a
concept considered later.15 The company rule also can be used
to show that the defendant employee knew of the danger. This
is not the inference upon an inference problem which causes con-
cern in some areas,16 since, in reality, two equally reasonable in-
ferences are drawn from the promulgation of the rule. After all,
the company would not single out a situation for special safety
precautions unless it felt the situation was extra dangerous. Thus
the company admits it is dangerous, and the employee discovers
the danger when he learns of the rule, if not before.
Note that evidence of a violation of the rule need not be in-
troduced for the rule to be admissible for this purpose, since the
mere existence and promulgation of the rule gives the required
proof of notice of danger. Of course, whichever type of rule is
introduced to show notice of danger, proper instructions may be
necessary to insure that the jury's application of the rule is proper.
The court will have to be particularly careful when a rule speaks
of degree of care, but the need for caution should not keep the rule
out of evidence.
B. To SHOW FEASIBILITY OF SAFEGUARDS
The courts recognize several methods of proving that a de-
fendant could have prevented the injury in question by using a
particular safeguard. 17 Obviously such evidence is admissible only
when the issue has been raised and requires a showing that the
proportionate advantage to be gained by using the safeguard in
question outweighs the disadvantages in cost and operating ef-
ficiency. One method of showing this is to have an expert give
his opinion about what could have been done to prevent the ac-
15 See note 43 infra.
16 See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 41 (3d ed. 1940); Jennings, Probative
Value of an Inference Drawn Upon Another Inference, 22 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 39 (1953).
17 See MORRIS, TORTS 103 (1953).
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cident.'8 Another method is to show the customary method of
operation used by others similarly situated, the presumption being
that the competitors have weighed the pros and cons and, since
they have remained in competition, the safeguards they chose are
practical.' 9 The rules of other companies similarly situated would
likewise seem to be admissible for this purpose.20 In like manner,
a company's rules, apparently made after some deliberation, in-
dicate that the company has decided such rules can be carried out.2 1
In actual practice, rules are attempted which are not practical so
they have to be abandoned and new ones substituted. However,
until they are abandoned, or unless the company can show that
they are impractical in fact, their mere existence is some evidence
of their feasibility. Of course, to be admissible for this purpose,
a rule must specify a particular mode of conduct as opposed to a
degree of care, and the evidence must show a failure to follow
the rule.
C. By PLAINTIFF TO SHOW ABSENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A company rule may be introduced on both sides of the con-
tributory negligence issue. Plaintiff can introduce a rule to show
his own due care, and the defendant can use it to show that plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence. In the former situation,
the defendant has attempted to prove that the conduct of the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The plaintiff can then in-
troduce a company rule, after first proving his knowledge thereof,
to show his conduct was justified because he relied upon the as-
sumption that the defendant would comply with the rule. The
courts have no difficulty in comparing this situation with those
concerning reliance upon habit or custom and, in a few instances,
reliance upon compliance with a statute. Thus, once knowledge
'. See Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negligence
Issues, 26 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1947).
19 See note 75 infra.
20 See note 76 infra.
"I See generally the discussion in admissions infra note 42. Feasibility
as such is considered in Derosier v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co.,
81 N. H. 451, 130 A. 145 (1925) and Smith v. Boston & M. R.R., 87
N. H. 246, 177 A. 729 (1937), although on subsequent appeal the rules
were kept out as being inapplicable to the fact situation involved.
88 N. H. 430, 190 A. 697, 191 A. 833 (1937).
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is shown the rule is usually admitted for this purpose.22 Of course
the number of persons knowing the rules would be far less than
the number who would know of an habitual manner of operating.
Off-duty employees would know of them,23 as would persons hav-
ing particularly close contact with the company. For example,
in a number of cases where firemen have sued streetcar companies,
the various rules of the streetcar companies pertaining to the
right of way to be given to emergency vehicles have been intro-
duced to show the fireman was justified in assuming that the street-
22 Where deceased was warned of an approaching train, held there was
no contributory negligence as a matter of law since the train was
traveling twice the speed set by the rules in Fannin v. Baltimore &
0. R. R., 253 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1958); where plaintiff knew of pre-
vious repeated conduct, which conduct was in fact in conformance
with a rule, the rule's admission was allowed in Sexton v. Key
System Transit Lines, 144 Cal. App.2d 719, 301 P.2d 612 (1956); where
plaintiff knew of a rule requiring trains to stop before passing other
trains receiving or discharging passengers and he passed behind such
a train without looking and was hit by a train violating the rule,
the rule was admitted in Yates v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R., 23 Del.
(7 Penn.) 472, 82 A. 27 (1906); a passenger who used a railroad for
five years was presumed to know a similar rule in Chicago & E. I.
R.R. v. Jennings, 89 Ill. App. 335 (1899), rev'd on other grounds in
190 Ill. 478, 60 N.E. 818 (1911) but see dissent in 190 Ill. 492; admis-
sibility is based upon reliance by the public in general in Baltimore
& 0. Ry. v. State, 81 Md. 371, 32 A. 201 (1895); plaintiff listened for
bell to be rung per the defendant's rule and stepped behind a stopped
train without looking to be hit in Emery v. Boston Elevated Ry.,
218 Mass. 255, 105 N.E. 889 (1914); the plaintiff's lack of knowledge
of a rule kept it out on the issue of contributory negligence in Corney
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 219 Mass. 552, 107 N.E. 411 (1914); but where
plaintiff said he did not know of a rule, the court held the jury could
have found that plaintiff relied on the custom in Lipski v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 248 Mass. 508, 143 N.E. 335 (1924); and where train
was in plain sight, the rules were held not to relieve the deceased
in West v. Detroit United Ry., 159 Mich. 269, 123 N.W. 1101 (1909).
See also Perrone v. Pennsylvania R.R., 136 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1943);
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Pingenot, 142 S.W. 93 (Tex. Civ. App.
1911); Southern Traction Co. v. Wilson, 187 S.W. 536 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916); Wichita Falls R. & F. W. Ry. v. Crawford, 19 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929). Compare Universe Tankships v. Pyrate Tank Clean-
ers, 152 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) where plaintiff's own rules were
held not to be admissible to show violation was contributory negli-
gence. See also Streeter v. Humrichouse, 357 Ill. 234, 191 N.E. 684
(1934) where an employee's violation of rule prohibiting riding in
front of engine was held to be not a cause, but a circumstance of
injury caused when he was hit by defendant's car. See also note
75 infra.
23 State, Use of Pachmayer v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 157 Md. 256, 145
A. 611 (1929).
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car would stop.2 4 As another example, in Chicago and A. R. Co. v.
Kelly,25 plaintiff's deceased was a transfer mail clerk employed
by the government to transfer mail between the various trains.
A railroad rule prohibited a train from passing a stopped train
while it was loading or unloading passengers. 26  Deceased was
passing behind a stopped train as his work normally required him
to do, when he was struck by a train violating this rule by speeding
at twenty-five miles an hour through the station. The rule of
the defendant company was admitted by the trial court and its
admissibility was approved on appeal because the decased had
worked on his job for one year and it was reasonable to assume
that he knew of this rule and thus acted reasonably when he
stepped from behind the stopped train without looking.
In many cases the plaintiff's only knowledge of a rule will
be acquired through watching its effect, i.e., by watching how an
operation is habitually performed. Thus the courts are disposed
to speak of habit and rules jointly in this area, without making
any distinction.27 In any event, while it is ordinarily not true that
the uncontroverted fact of reliance upon a rule or a habit should
free a plaintiff from contributory negligence as a matter of law,
it is certainly reasonable to consider such reliance in determining
that issue.
There are a number of cases, particularly in jurisdictions where
prior cases have based admissibility upon the plaintiff's knowledge
of a rule, which have refused to admit rules because the plaintiff
did not know of them.28 There is often no indication that these
rules were offered specifically upon the issue of plaintiff's con-
24 Chicago City Ry. v. McDonough, 221 Ill. 69, 77 N.E. 577 (1906); Dole
v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 121 La. 945, 46 So. 929 (1908); McKer-
nan v. Detroit Citizens St. Ry., 138 Mich. 519, 101 N.W. 812 (1904);
Toledo Ry. & Light Co. v. Ward, 2 Ohio CC NS 256, 25 Ohio CC 399,
aff'd per curiam, 71 Ohio St. 492, 74 N.E. 1142 (1904).
25 Chicago & A. R.R. v. Kelly, 75 Ill. App. 490 (1897), 80 Il. App. 675
(1898), aff'd 182 Ill. 267, 54 N.E. 979 (1899).
26 See cases supra note 22 for cases involving similar rules.
27 Chicago City Ry. v. Lowitz, 218 Ill. 24, 75 N.E. 755 (1905).
28 Smellie v. Southern Pac. Ry., 128 Cal. App. 56E, 18 P.2d 97 (1933),
aff'd with reservation as to company rules in 128 Cal. App. 583,
19 P.2d 981 [later California cases contrary, see Powell v. Pacific
Electric Ry., 35 Cal. 2d 40, 216 P.2d 448 (1950)]; Merritt v. Michigan
Central R.R., 158 Ill. App. 38 (1910); Lake Shore & M. S.R. Co. v.
Brown, 123 Ill. 162, 14 N.E. 197 (1887); Louisville Ry. v. Gaugh, 133
Ky. 467, 118 S.W. 276 (1909); Isackson v. Duluth St. Ry., 75 Minn. 27,
77 N.W. 433 (1898); Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71 Minn. 438, 74 N.W.
166 (1898); Lawson v. Union P. R.R., 113 Neb. 745, 204 N.W. 791
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tributory negligence. Rather, the courts have assumed that this
is the only basis upon which admission is possible.2 9 In the juris-
dictions so holding, the knowledge of the plaintiff is an absolute
prerequisite for the admissibility of any company rule. This article,
of course, discusses other bases of admissibility which do not re-
quire such knowledge.
D. By DEFENDANT TO SHOW PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The other instance wherein safety rules are admitted on the
issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence is quite different from
any other considered in this paper. This is the situation where
the defendant has promulgated rules for persons to follow and the
plaintiff is injured while violating them. For example, a street-
car company posts an easily readable sign prohibiting passengers
from standing upon open platforms while the car is in motion,
yet plaintiff stands thereon and is injured when the defendant
performs some negligent act. The rule is usually admitted in
such cases on the issue of contributory negligence.30
Unquestionably when the plaintiff has knowledge of the rule,
or where the circumstances are such that he should know of it,
a jury is justified in considering his failure to comply with the
rules as some evidence of his lack of proper care. 31 The decisions
support this view as long as the defendant company has posted the
rules where the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to see them
"12
(1925); Chabott v. Grand Trunk Ry., 77 N.H. 133, 88 A. 995 (1913);
Walker v. Silvio, 5 N.J. Misc. 833, 138 A. 510 (1927); Taddeo v. Tilton,
248 App. Div. 290, 289 N.Y.S. 427 (1936); Virginia Ry. & Power Co.
v. Godsey, 117 Va. 167, 83 S.E. 1072 (1915). Contra: Boldt v. San
Antonio Traction Co., 148 S.W. 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), where
court specifically says knowledge of plaintiff is immaterial.
29 It would probably be arguable that cases so holding are proper author-
ity for admitting such rules, where known, to free plaintiff of contrib-
utory negligence.
3o Pruitt v. San Pedro L.A. & S.L. R.R., 161 Cal. 29, 118 P. 223 (1911)
(statute required compliance); Baltimore & Y. Turnpike Road v. Cason,
72 Md. 377, 20 A. 113 (1890) ("assumed risk"); Renaud v. New York,
M.H. & H. R.R., 210 Mass. 553, 97 N.E. 98 (1912); McDonough v.
Boston Elevated Ry., 191 Mass. 509, 78 N.E. 141 (1906).
31 See BEACH, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE §§ 151-52 (3d ed. 1899);
PROSSER, TORTS 286 (2d ed. 1955); 3 MOORE, CARRIERS § 1571
(2d ed. 1914).
32 In Cutts v. Boston Elevated Ry., 202 Mass. 450, 89 N.E. 21 (1909) rules
intended for the public were held inadmissible because they were so
placed on the side of the car that they were behind a gate when
the train stopped.
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and as long as the conduct called for is not unreasonable as a
matter of law.33 Rules would not be admissible for this purpose
when compliance is impractical or impossible, as when the number
of streetcars is inadequate to carry all passengers during the rush
hour so that passengers must ride on the platform contrary to a
posted rule. Also the rules have been excluded where the de-
fendant has allowed habitual non-compliance without making any
attempt to enforce the rules, thus causing plaintiff to be lulled
into disobedience. 34
In a few instances, failure to obey rules has been held to be
contributory negligence as a matter of law,3 5 but it would seem
that unless the conduct itself was negligent regardless of the
rule violation it would normally be a jury question, especially
since the reasonableness of the rule itself and any justification for
non-compliance will be of prime importance in most cases.
E. DuTY TO MAKE RULES AD ENFORCE THEM
Interestingly enough, when the courts have been presented
with an allegation that a defendant company has failed to make,
promulgate, or enforce safety rules, they have allowed the plain-
tiff to show such failure on the issue of the defendant company's
33 Florida Ry. v. Dorsey, 59 Fla. 260, 52 So. 963 (1910).
34 In Garcia v. San Diego Electric Ry., 75 Cal. App. 2d 729, 170 P.2d
957 (1946) whether violation was habitually allowed held to be ques-
tion of fact for jury; in O'Day v. Boston Elevated Ry., 218 Mass.
515, 106 N.E. 144 (1914) held for jury to decide whether defendant had
made any effort to enforce the rules.
35 Where violation of statute is negligence per se and a statute requires
compliance with posted rules, violation of rule was held to be negli-
gence per se. Prutt v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L. R.R., 161 Cal. 29,
118 P. 223 (1911). Where a rule prohibited riding on steps of moving
streetcar and deceased violated it, the court held that such violation
would be negligence per se, partly because statute allowed such rules,
but there was dictum to the effect that violation with knowledge pre-
cludes recovery where contributory negligence is an issue. The court
also noted that similar conduct had been held to be negligence per
se without rules. However recovery was allowed under Massachu-
setts law despite deceased's contributory negligence because widow
and next of kin were suing and deceased was a "passenger" within
the statute. Note that the rule affected the conductor's duty, however,
since he could assume reliance. Renaud v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,
210 Mass. 553, 97 N.E. 98 (1912). Cf. Jackson v. Grand Avenue Ry.,
118 Mo. 199, 24 S.W. 192 (1893) where a rule which was the same
as a statute was held to be only some evidence of contributory
negligence.
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own negligence. 36 The theory relied upon is that where a complex
situation is fraught with dangers,37 the company has a duty to the
general public within the area of possible harm to take positive
steps to prevent the happening of such foreseeable dangers, even
to the extent of making a scientific study to discover dangers not
obvious to the average person. While the courts have not pointed
up such a distinction, it would seem proper to show this non-fea-
sance only when the company's own negligence is an issue, since
this is not a duty of the employee. Appropriate allegations against
the company would also be necessary.
It must be recognized that drawing such a distinction would
allow a jury to find that an employee, in the absence of warning
and lacking the technical talents of the entire company, was not
negligent, while the company could be held liable because of its
superior knowledge and its greater duty.38
III. RELATION OF THE RULES TO THE STANDARD OF
CARE IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
A. IN GENERAL
By far the greaest number of cases concerning safety rules
involve the relationship which these rules bear to the standard of
36 Yeats v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 241 IML 205, 89 N.E. 338 (1909) (dictum);
Eichorn v. New Orleans & C. R. Light and Power Co., 112 La. 236,
36 So. 335 (1904); Sundmaker v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R., 106
La. 111, 30 So. 285 (1901); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. State, 81 Md. 371,
32 A. 201 (1895) (dictum); O'Day v. Boston Elevated Ry., 218 Mass.
515, 106 N.E. 144 (1914) (on failure to enforce); McKernan v. Detroit
Citizens' St. Ry., 138 Mich. 519, 101 N.W. 812 (1904) (concurring);
King v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 233 N.Y. 330, 135 N.E. 519(1922) (on failure to enforce); Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Altemeir, 60 Ohio
St. 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899) (dictum); McCormick v. Columbia Electric
St. Ry. L. & P. Co., 85 S.C. 455, 67 S.E. 562 (1910) (dictum). Contra
Harrison v Mobile Light & R. Co., 233 Ala. 393, 171 So. 742 (1937)
37 See generally the discfission on knowledge of danger supra note 6
et seq.
38 Shawnee-Tecumseh Traction Co. v. Wollard, 54 Okla. 432, 153 P. 1189
(1915). Plaintiff's petition in that case alleged negligent rules, and
the court admitted the rules, predicating negligence on the company in
making them, and on the employee in obeying them. Quaere. Under
our theory could the employee have been held not liable? See 2
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 317, commented (1934) on the duty of
a master to control his employees with the result that if he has a
superior knowledge he may be liable for failure to warn even though
the employee may not be liable if his ignorance is excusable. See
also note 114 infra and the Dougherty case.
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care found in the substantive law of negligence. This standard
makes an act or omission negligent if it falls below what an ordi-
nary, reasonable, and prudent man would do under the circum-
stances. 39 This standard is primarily negative in nature in that it
forbids a general type of conduct, but does not command any
specific action. In applying it to a case, the court or jury usually
need not decide what should have been done but must merely
determine whether what was done was or was not reasonable.
There are, however, a few instances where a positive and absolute
standard of conduct is applied as where, in some jurisdictions, the
violation of a statute is negligence per se.40 In other jurisdictions
statutes are admitted only to show evidence of negligence, in much
the same way as the customs of others similarly situated or the
opinions of experts.4 1 How can we distinguish between the posi-
tive standard which is binding on the parties and that which is
merely some evidence to be used in applying the standard?
Consider the statement: "Trucks should not exceed fifteen
miles per hour on Main Street between Tenth and Twentieth
Streets." Suppose a truck drives through this area at twenty-two
miles per hour causing the injuries which are the subject of litiga-
tion. Now the jury, or the judge in a non-jury case, must be swayed
from its originally impartial position to be able to hold for the
plaintiff. All relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the
accident and pertaining to the issues are presented to the jury.
Once it determines what actually happened and knows all the
circumstances which bear upon the propriety of the conduct in
question, the jury must decide if what was done was proper by
applying the standards of negligence as instructed. If the state-
ment concerning the speed limit were given to the jury without
explanation, it would probably be taken by them to mean that
proof of violation would prove liability; but if the jury were told
that an expert made the statement, or that it is a custom, or that
it is an ordinance, and if they were told further that it is not to
3) 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS, § 16.1 (1956); MORRIS, TORTS,
47 (1953); and PROSSER, TORTS, (2d ed. 1955); SHERMAN AND
REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE, § 1 (Rev. Ed., Zipp, 1941); 2 RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS, § 282 (1934).
40 See note 63 infra.
41 For a general analysis of the various uses of specific standards which
can be applied in negligence actions see James and Siegerson, Partic-
ularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 697
(1952). Included are standards set by the courts (704), by habit
and custom (709), very briefly by company rules (712) and by expert
opinion. (714).
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be considered an absolute standard, then it is reasonable for the
jury to consider the statement as having a bearing upon their de-
cision, but not as compelling any particular verdict.
After all, the jurymen often lack the expertness to say what is
or is not due care so that they must be given the benefit of any-
thing reasonably calculated to help them. Great weight may be
given to the above-quoted statement by the jury, but usually com-
paratively greater weight than this should be accorded it. The
difficulty is, of course, that the statement is couched in imperative
terms, i.e., the speed limit "must" or "should" be observed, so the
mere fact that the court admits it into evidence may seem to be
an approval of such an interpretation of these terms. Neverthe-
less it is possible for the court to so phrase its instructions as to
minimize the chances of misinterpretation. This distinction be-
tween an absolute standard and evidence to be applied to the
standard of negligence is extremely important in our further con-
sideration of the proper use of company rules and will be referred
to from time to time.
B. As ADMISsIoNs OR DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
One line of cases has based the admissibility of safety rules in
whole or in part upon the theory that they are admissions or decla-
rations against interest.42 An admission is sometimes termed an
exception to the hearsay rule whereby the extra-judicial declara-
42 Powell v. Pacific Electric Ry. 35 Cal.2d 40, 216 P.2d 448 (1950), Palmer v.
City of Long Beach, 189 P.2d 62, Cal App. (1948); Hurley v. Connecticut
Co., 118 Conn. 276, 172 A. 86 (1934); Southern Ry. v. Tudor, 46 Ga.
App. 563, 168 S.E. 98 (1933); Atlantic Consol. St. Ry. v. Bates, 103
Ga. 333, 30 S.E. 41 (1898); Georgia R.R. v. Williams, 74 Ga. 723 (1885);
Chicago City Ry. v. Lowitz, 218 Ill. 24, 75 N.E. 755 (1905); Lake
Shore & M.S. R.R. v. Ward, 135 II. 511, 26 N.E. 520 (1891); Standard
Oil Co. v. Allen, 121 N.E. 329 (Ind.App. 1918), rev-d on other grounds
189 Ind. 398, 126 N.E. 674; Smith v. Cleveland, C.,C., & St. L. Ry.,
67 Ind. App. 397, 117 N.E. 534 (1917); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Gregory,
279 Ky. 295, 130 S.W.2d 745 (1939) [despite efforts to distinguish,
this case seems contrary to prior Kentucky cases. See Louisville Ry. v.
Gaugh, 133 Ky. 467, 118 S.W. 276 (1909)]; Patapsco R.R. v. Bowers,
213 Md. 78, 129 A.2d 802 (1957); Pennsylvania R.R. v. State, 188
Md. 646, 53 A.2d 562 (1947), 190 Md. 586, 59 A.2d 190 (1948); Stevens
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338 (1904); Derosier v.
New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 130 A. 145 (1925); Canham
v. Rhode Island Co., 35 R. I. 177, 85 A. 1050 (1913); Wichita Falls,
R. and F. W. Ry. v. Crawford, 19 S.W.2d 166 Tex. Civ App. (1929);
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v Pingenot, 142 SW. 93 (Tex.Civ.App. 1911);
but see Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Altemeier, 60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300
(1899) admitting rules but specifically denying that they are admis-
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tions of a party become admissible into evidence.4 3 A declaration
against interest, although used by some courts to include admissions,
is more properly limited to an extra-judicial declaration made by
a non-party at a time when it is contrary to his financial interest
to make such a statement. 44 Peculiarly enough, despite the courts'
use of such terminology as "admissions," "declarations against
interest" and, as will be later discussed, "res gestae," no case has
been found which discusses safety rules as being hearsay. How-
ever, our previous distinction between management's determina-
tion that a particular safety rule should be adopted, as opposed
to the continuing "existence" of the rules at the time of the accident,
points out why the probim arises. When plaintiff's counsel seeks
to use the company rules as an admission, he is referring to the
earlier extra-judicial determination by management to adopt the
rules.45 To this extent a copy of the rules introduced at the trial
is evidence of this extra-judicial declaration and is hearsay, but
being admissions of a party the rules are admissible if they are
relevant.
Whether the rules are relevant as admissions will depend upon
whether the adoption of a safety rule is in fact a determination by
sions. Wigmore seems to take the view that rules are admissions.
"The regulations adopted by an employer for the conduct of a factory
or transportation system, may be some evidence of his belief as to
the standard of care required, and thus of the negligent nature of an
act violating these rules." 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 282 at 132
(3d ed. 1940). The best analysis of company rules to date also con-
siders the rules as admissions. Morris, Admissions and the Negli-
gence Issue, 29 Texas L. Rev. 407 at 412 and 432 (1951).
43 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 239 (1954); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 1048 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hear-
say Rule, 30 Yale L. J. 355 (1921); but for view that admissions are
not heresay see Strahorn, The Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85
U. Pa. L. Rev. 484, 564 at 573 (1937). Taking sides on controversey
is unnecessary for this article, although the theory that they are an
exception to the hearsay rule is assumed for the remainder of the
paragraph.
44 Cases calling company rules "declarations against interest" include
Barron v. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry., 249 S.W. 825 (Tex.Civ.App. 1923);
Gillium v. Pacific Coast R.R., 152 Wash. 657, 279 P 114 (1929). The
fallacy of such terminology can be seen from any discussion on this
exception. See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1456 et seq. (3d ed. 1940);
Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1952).
4G Such "admission" may be looked upon as a declaration (by promul-
gating written rules) or as an act (by permitting the continued observ-
ance and enforcement of them). For examples of other admissions
by conduct see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1060-62 (3d ed. 1940).
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the company of what it actually considers to be a proper standard
of conduct. Now, as has been assumed elsewhere in this paper,
a company has a duty to adopt reasonable rules to insure safe
operations." Moreover, the rules which it adopts can be assumed
to be feasible.4 7 Thus, the rules under consideration are reasonably
calculated to prevent injury and are, from a practical point of
view, likely to be capable of being carried out. The company then
has admitted by the very adoption of the rules that it considers
the prescribed conduct proper under the circumstances. Note that
this is not the establishment of a negligence standard per se, but is
an admission which can be used to persuade the jury that, despite
the company's present contention that what was done was reason-
able, the company has at one time taken a contrary position. The
company can seek to refute the validity of the rule by showing
that it is not feasible in fact, or that it is unreasonable or unneces-
sary, but the rule itself will still stand for reasonableness and
feasibility at least to some extent.
Since by definition an admission is evidence only against the
person who has made it, and since the company rule is only an
admission of the company, it would seem to be admissible only
against the company and not the employee insofar as it is con-
sidered as an admission.4 8 Thus where both the master and the
servant are defendants, the rule is an admission of the master
only. While the court would have at least discretionary power to
admit it against the master, subsequent discussion will indicate
that no harm is done in admitting the rule for general purposes.
C. As A CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER WHICH THE EMPLOYEE ACTS
Suppose however that plaintiff, apart from any offer of proof
that the rule is an admission of the company, seeks to introduce it
into evidence under a general allegation of negligence, claiming
that its violation was some evidence of the employee's negligence.
Here no distinction between a defendant who is master or a servant
need be drawn, since it is the servant's own negligence which is
the issue and the rule is considered as something which existed
at the time the employee acted.
46 Supra note 36.
47 Supra note 21.
48 In Streeter v. Humrichhouse, 357 IlM. 234, 191 N.E. 684 (1934) the court
denied admissibility because the railroad was not a party. See also
Carter v. Sioux City Serv. Co., 160 Iowa 78, 141 N.W. 26 (1913)
where one of the reasons given for not admitting a rule was the fact
that the railroad was not a defendant.
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In admitting rules under this theory, the courts repeatedly
tend to use the same trite phrases to indicate that the rules have
some evidentiary value. A court may say a rule is "evidence of
negligence, '4 9 "some evidence," 50 a "circumstance," 51 or a "cir-
cumstance proper to be considered by the jury., 52 In other cases
the rules are said to have value as "illustrating negligence,"53 as
"bearing upon the care required,"54 or as "tending to prove negli-
gence,"' 5 5 as well as in other ways.56 Our problem is to understand
the underlying rationale of such terminology and to test its valid-
ity.57
In the definition of negligence, the reasonable man test is
applied to the circumstances surrounding the accident. Thus any
49 McNiel v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 282 Mass. 575, 185 N.E. 471
(1933).
50 Hurley v. Connecticut Co., 118 Conn. 276, 172 A. 86 (1934); Mascoela
v. Wise, Smith & Co., 120 Conn. 699, 181 A. 629 (1935); Deister v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 99 Kan. 525, 162 P. 282 (1917); Chadbourne v.
Springfield St. Ry., 199 Mass. 574, 85 N.E. 737 (1908); McCormick v.
Columbia Electric St. Ry. L. & P. Co., 85 S. C. 455, 67 S.E. 562 (1910).
See also (2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 283 at 123 (3d ed. 1940).
51 Southern Pac. R.R. v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1942), Cert. denied
63 S.Ct. 154.
52 Simon v. City and County of San Francisco, 79 Cal. App. 2d 590,
180 P.2d 393 (1947); Gett v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 192 Cal. 621,
221 P. 376 (1923).
53 Southern Ry. v. Allen, 88 Ga. App. 435, 77 S.E.2d 277 (1953); Callaway
v. Pickard, 6& Ga. App. 637, 23 S.E.2d 564 (1942); Foster v. Southern Ry.,
42 Ga. App. 830, 157 S.E. 371 (1931); Southern Ry. v. Tiller, 20 Ga.
App. 251, 92 S.E. 1011 (1917). The Georgia cases are particularly dif-
ficult to analyze since it seems that the only basis for admission
considered by the court is that the rules "illustrate" negligence, a
concept very difficult to understand.
5 4 Chicago City Ry. v. McDonough, 221 Ill. 69, 77 N.E. 577 (1906); Meyers
v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L. R.R., 36 Utah 307, 104 P. 736 (1909)
r5 Frizzell v. Omaha St. Ry., 124 F. 176 (8th Cir. 1903); Foster v. Kansas
City Ry., 315 Mo. 1004, 235 S.W. 1070 (1921).
56 See Toner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 239 Pa. 438, 106 A. 797 (1919); Texas
& Pacific Ry. v. Hastings, 282 S.W.2d 758. (Tex.Civ.App. 1953); [citing
35 Tex.Jur. 434-5 (35 Tex.Jur., Railroads §§ 289-290 hold rules are
admissible as some evidence)]; Johns v. Baltimore & Ohio Rairoad
Company, 143 F.Supp. 15 (W.D. Penn. 1956) aff'd 239 F.2d 385 (3
Cir. 1956) without discussion.
57 Th best case discussion in this area is Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Altemeier,
60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899) stating the rule is "inseparably con-
nected with the accident as one of the circumstances surrounding the
case."
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circumstance existing at the time and place of an accident should
be admitted into evidence if it is such that the actions of a reason-
able man would be influenced by it. Now, as has been mentioned,
a company rule can be considered as having some sort of continuing
existence. It existed prior to, during, and after the accident. Some
courts speak of the rules in terms of res gestae,58 a poor choice of
words, perhaps, but serving to indicate the contemporaneous na-
ture of the rule and the accident. The rules in question are a cir-
cumstance under which the defendant employee was acting.
Now for these rules to be relevant as a circumstance and thus
admissible in a negigence action, they must have some logical
connection in the mind of a reasonable man with the manner in
which he should act. In other words, a company rule is admissible
as a circumstance of the accident if a reasonable man would con-
sider the rule before acting. Since the rule in question is a safety
rule,59 since its nature as a safety rule is properly limited to what
a reasonable man could consider to be a safety rule, and since the
rule must require conduct somewhere between what is required
as a matter of law and what is unreasonable as a matter of law,60
it would seem to follow that a reasonable man would consider a
rule, known to him, before acting. While the underlying ration-
ale for all this appears to require a rather tedious reasoning
process to expect of an employee in order to determine what he
should do to act reasonably, this conclusion actually would prob-
ably follow as a snap judgment. After all, the employee knows
that he may be disciplined or lose his job if he fails to obey the
rules. But more in point he knows, or at least should realize,
tthat the company for which, he works is in a better position to
see the over-all picture and is thus more likely to develop safer
methods. Moreover, the employee, as a reasonable man, realizes
58 Chicago City Ry. v. Lowitz, 218 I. 24, 75 N.E. 755 (1905); Cincinnati
St. Ry. v. Altemeier, 60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899). This particular
use, or perhaps misuse, of the term "res gestae" indicates the practi-
cally meaningless nature of the word. Obviously this use is not the
"spontaneous exclamation" spoken of by Wigmore (6 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, § 1745 et seq.) nor does it seem to fit his "verbal act"
(§ 1766 et seq.) although it probably is covered by the concept of
"part of the transaction" (§ 1757 at p. 168) as one way of saying it
is relevant. Even then it is difficult to say the rule is an "utterance".
Nor does it fit into Morgan's definition unless as an operational fact
[Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res
Gestae, 31 Yale L. J. 229 (1922)] if, again, the rule can even be con-
sidered as an "utterance".
59 Infra note 96.
60 Infra note 99.
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that the purpose of the rules is safety and that his failure to
obey them may result in harm. He also realizes that others rely
on the safety pattern set by the rules. The jury should at least
be told that the rule existed at the time of the accident, that the
employee knew or should have known of it, and that he violated
it.
It would be well to note at this time the erroneous exclusion
of company rules by several courts for the reason that they in-
vade the province of the jury. This idea is often expressed by
the simple statement that "the standard is set by the law, not by
the defendant."6 1 To quarrel with this statement would be foolish,
but to say that it applies as a reason for keeping rules out of evi-
dence is to misunderstand the distinction which this article draws
between the negligence standard of care and what is meant by the
"circumstance" portion of that standard. The error lies in assum-
ing that the company rule is an absolute standard so that the jury
must find for plaintiff if it finds that the defendant employee vio-
lated the rule. The rule is admitted not as an absolute standard,
but as evidence of a "circumstance" under which the accident
,1 This statement sometimes with slight variations, is found in Smellie v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 128 Cal. App. 567, 18 P.2d 97 (1933) aff'd with
reservation as to company rules in 128 Cal.App. 583, 19 P.2d 982;
[but see Powell v. Pacific Electric Ry., 35 Cal. 2d 40, 216 P.2d 448 (1950)
admitting rules as admissions (note 42 supra)]; Merchants Transfer
Storage Co. v. Chicago R. L & P. Ry., 170 Iowa 378, 150 N.W. 720
(1915); Caster v. Sioux City Service Co., 160 Iowa 78, 141 N.W. 26
(1913); Hoffman v. Cedar Rapids & M. C. Ry., 157 Iowa 655, 139
N.W. 165 (1912) (including five and one-half pages on company rules);
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Stidham's Adm'r, 187 Ky. 139, 218 S.W. 460
(1920); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Vaughn's Adm'r, 183 Ky. 829, 210
S.W. 938 (1919); Isackson v. Duluth St. Ry., 75 Minn. 27, 77 N.W.
433 (1898); Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71 Minn. 438, 74 N.W. 166
(1898); Fries v. Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956); De Ryss
v. New York Cent. R.R., 275 N.Y. 85, 9 N.E.2d 788 (1937); Epstein,
Henning & Co. v. Nashville, C & St. L. Ry., 4 Tenn. App. 412 (1926);
Southern Traction Co. v. Wilson, 187 S.W. 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)
may be contra other Texas cases. See not 56 supra); Virginia Ry.
& Power Co. v. Godsey, 117 Va. 167, 83 S.E. 1072 (1915). But see
the discussion on this point in the leading case favoring admissibility.
Bryan v. Southern Pac. Co., 79 Ariz. 253, 286 P.2d 761 (1955). Cf.
Sullivan v. Richmond Light & R.R., 128 App. Div. 175, 112, N.Y.S.
648 (1908) where the court, after setting out the usual negligence
standard, says: "That the defendant ... has adopted . . . a higher
standard is material ... for the motorman's violation of the rule
showed... a negligent disregard of the duty under which he rested."
The court cited Stevens v. Boston Elevated Ry., 184 Mass. 476, 69
N.E. 338 (1904) (supra notes 1 and 42) but the Stevens case does not
seem to go to that extent.
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occurred. In fact, the proper application of the standard set by
law requires the disclosure of all the circumstances relevant to
the accident. The law then demands that the circumstance of the
violation of the rule be shown. The jury can consider the rule, and
ignore it if it finds that a reasonable man would have ignored it
under the other circumstances. The decision as to what was
negligent is still the jury's and it need not accept the rule as the
standard.
Since the courts have freqtiently drawn specific analogies be-
tween the admissibility of safety rules as evidence in negligence
cases and two other areas of admissibility, it is proper that they be
singled out for separate comparison to better explain the use of
the rules. The reference is to the admissibility of statutes, munici-
pal ordinances, and administrative orders; and to the admissibility
of custom and habit.
D. COMPARISON wrTH STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
Within the well defined and generally accepted limitations
which are discussed at greater length in another section,6 2 statutes
are usually admitted on the issue of negligence, either as an ab-
solute standard whereby violation is negligence per se, or as some
evidence which the jury can consider but need not use absolutely
as a standard.6 3 Without indulging in the dispute about why
statutes and ordinances have a relationship to negligence, it is
possible to take two common reasons advanced for their applica-
tion and see how they apply to safety rules.64 These reasons are:
62 Infra note 105:
63 James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 La.
L. Rev. 95 (1950); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legis-
lation, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1932); Morris, The Relation of Criminal
Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1933); Morris, The
Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 Col. L. Rev. 21
(1949); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Harv. L. Rev.
317 (1914).
64 Rules are distinguished from statutes in Davis v. Johnson, 128 Cal.
App.2d 466, 275 P.2d 563 (1954); they are "somewhat analagous to
proof of the violation of an ordinance or statute" in Stevans v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338 (1904); the two were dis-
tinguished and the rules not admitted in Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry.,
71 Minn. 438, 74 N.W. 166 (1898); the rules were distinguished and
seemingly kept out of evidence solely because of the distinction in
Boston & M. R.R. v. Daniel, 290 F. 916 (2d Cir. 1923); and the two
were "somewhat analagous" in Sullivan v. Richmond Light & R. Co.,
128 App. Div. 175, 112 N.Y.S. 648 (1908).
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(1) that the legislature intended to make the violation of a statute
negligence; and (2) that a reasonable man would obey a statute.
As regards the legislature's intention to set a standard, a much
discussed and often criticized reason why statutes are admitted,
any very exacting analogy with safety rules is obviously impossible
because the legislature, as the governing body, has the power to
set standards which are binding on the parties if it so desires, a
power private companies obviously lack. Note, however, that the
legislature, as the representative of the public, has a duty to exer-
cise its police powers to insure the safety of the public by passing
statutes aimed at safety, and the governed individual has a duty
to the government to obey them. Likewise note that a private
company has a duty to make safety rules to protect the general
public,0 5 and the individual employee has a contractual duty to
obey them. 6 Thus in both the company rule situation and the
statute situation, the rule maker owes a duty to the protected
person and the person subject to the rule owes a duty to the rule
maker. 7 While the respective duties have apparent differences,
some basis for comparison does exist.
The criticism that the legislature did not intend to create
civil liability by criminal statute can also be applied to the use
of the admission theory for the admissibility of safety rules. It
can be argued that the company did not intend to admit that any
violation of a rule would be evidence of negligence in an action
by a third party. Yet both the legislature and the company are
presumed to have deliberated and exercised some mature judg-
ment in establishing a regulation to prevent harm, which harm
has in fact occurred after a violation of the rule.
The other reason advanced for admitting statutes-that a rea-
sonable man will obey a statute-has been discussed in the com-
ments concerning the effect which a company rule would have
,5 Supra note 36.
(3 Infra note 139.
47 This comparison between the respective duties of the two rule making
bodies to the general public is also made in the leading case of Stevens
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338 (1904). The leading
case contra [Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71 Minn. 438, 74 N.W. 166(1898)] goes out of its way to distinguish the two. Perhaps the
reason for this is that in Minnesota, violation of a statute is negligence
per se, something that would normally never hold for company rules,.
while in Massachusetts violation is only evidence of negligence as are
company rule violations where admissible. See also Boston & M. R.R.
v. Daniel, 290 F. 916 (2d Cir. 1923).
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upon a reasonable man as a circumstance of the accident.68 It was
then argued that in order to decide if the defendant's conduct was
reasonable, the jury should be fully apprised of the fact that the
defendant violated a safety rule which he either knew or should
have known. Such arguments are the same for statutes.
While many jurisdictions have decided that the violation of
a statute is negligence per se, it is obvious that the same could not
be said of company rules because of the differing positions of the
legislature and the company, a proposition which is men'tioned in
a later section. 69 Municipal ordinances lacking some of the force
and, perhaps, the dignity of statutes are more likely to be put
into evidence only as some evidence of negligence. Likewise, ad-
ministrative rules and regulations and specific administrative
orders are usually admissible, although, unless promulgated under
a statute prescribing them in some detail, they are also more likely
to be some evidence of negligence rather than an absolute stand-
ard.7 0 It would seem that these latter types of commands lie some-
where between statutes and company rules, and the analysis per-
taining to statutes and company rules is to some degree applicable
to them.
1. A City's Violation of Its Own Ordinances
One series of cases based upon the violation of municipal or-
dinances often uses company rule cases for its authority.71 Involved
6s Supra note 49 et seq.
69 Infra note 118.
70 Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence
Actions, 28 Texas L. Rev. 143 (1949).
71 In Palmer v. City of Long Beach, 189 P.2d 62 (Cal.App. 1948) an
ordinance was admitted on the basis of 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 282 (3d ed. 1940), the section including company rules, but on
,appeal the rules were not admitted because of the invalidity of a
stipulation, with a strong dissent giving an excellent analysis of com-
pany rule cases. 33 Cal.2d 134, 199 P.2d 952 (1948). Cases allowing
admission on this theory are Shumway v. City of Burlington, 108 Iowa
424, 79 N.W. 123 (1899)'; Smith v. City of Pella, 86 Iowa 236, 53 N.W. 225
(1892) (violation as prima facie evidence) but see note 80 infra for
Iowa cases on company rules being kept out of evidence; Hebenheimer
v. City of St. Louis, 269 Mo. 92, 189 S.W. 1180 (1916). Cf. Wenzel v.
State, 178 Misc. 932, 36 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1942) where the state was held
liable for failure to comply with the Manual of Uniform Control
Devices which had been adopted by a state-appointed commission;
and Curray v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. S.C. 1954) where
instructions given to service men about putting out flares on highway
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is the situation where the courts have admitted into evidence city
ordinances with which the city's employees have failed to comply,
thus injuring the plaintiff. Examples include: the failure of the
city to enforce an ordinance which requires all openings in the
sidewalk to be protected, as a result of which the plaintiff fell
and was injured;72 or the failure of the city to provide sidewalks
which were four feet wide, as required by ordinance, with the
result that plaintiff was injured when he stepped off the sidewalk
at a place where it suddenly became narrower than four feet.73
In each of these situations the city fathers met and by the
exercise of their own judgment, often on the basis of expert advice,
decided that a particular safeguard or precaution is advisable.
Then a city employee, or city employees, fails to enforce the or-
dinance and the plaintiff's injury is caused by the non-enforcement.
This line of cases seems to substantiate the discussion throughout
the first part of this article since the action of the city fathers in
passing an ordinance is comparable with the action of the com-
pany's management in adopting safety rules, each rule maker
being motivated by the desire and the duty so to govern its em-
ployees as to protect the public. Likewise an ordinance gives rise
to a duty on the part of an employee to obey it. When he fails
to do so and the plaintiff is injured thereby, the jury should be
apprised of this circumstance of the accident.
E. COMPARISON WITH CUSTOM OR HABIT
Safety rules have in some places been compared to, in others
contrasted with, custom and habit.7 4  As noted earlier, the admis-
held to be admissions of defendant. But in Davis v. Manchester,
62 N.H. 422 (1882) an ordinance was not admissible where a statute
specifically limited the city's liability. Nor are ordinances admissible
if passed after the accident. McCartney v. City of Washington, 124
Iowa 382, 100 N.W. 80 (1904).
72 McNerney v. City of Reading, 15 Pa. 611, 25 A. 57 (1892); McLeod v.
City of Spokane, 26 Wash. 346, 67 P. 74 (1901).
73 Jordan v. City of Lexington, 133 Miss. 440, 97 So. 758 (1923).
74 In Cros v. Boston & M. R.R., 223 Mass. 144, 111 N.E. 676 (1916) the
court cited a leading company rule case [Stevens v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338 (1904)] as authority for admitting
custom. In Fries v. Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956) customs
cases are used as authority for refusing to admit rules. In Canham v.
Rhode Island Co., 39 R.I. 177, 85 A. 1050 (1913) company rules admis-
sibility was supported by cases holding habits to be admissions of what
precautions the actor considered necessary. In Blerens v. Houston
Elec. Co., 235 S.W. 987 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) numerous habit cases
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sibility of safety rules where the plaintiff has relied upon the de-
fendant complying with them is usually considered as involving
an analysis identical to the use of custom for the same purpose.7
Authorities likewise recognize that the rules of numerous other
companies similarly situated are admissible on the negligence issue
under the same theory as are the customs and usages of others
similarly situated.7 6
The important question in making comparisons involves the
relationship between habit, safety rules, and due care. Under
consideration is the relationship which the habit or rule bears to
the reasonable man test, and whether either or both should be
allowed in evidence for the jury to consider. Harper and James
specifically include company rules in their section on custom and
habit. In arguing for the admission of both habit and company
rules, they say:
But where a party has habitually or frequently taken certain
precautions on prior occasions which were omitted on the occasion
in question, this fact should be received against him as an admis-
sion that he perceived the risk and deemed the precaution appro-
priate and feasible. On such basis company rules should be and
are by many courts admitted.77
Harper and James consider both safety rules and safety habits to
be properly admissible on the theory that they are admissions of
the defendant.
were cited as authority for not admitting rules. In Phillips v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 125 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1942) rule and custom
were not distinguished. Cf. Yeates v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 241 Ill. 205,
89 N.E. 338 (1909) where a duty to promulgate rules was not complied
with so a custom was admitted in lieu thereof.
75 See note 19 supra. The following cases compare reliance upon company
rules with reliance on customs or habit: Chicago City Ry. v. Lowitz,
218 Ill. 24, 75 N.E. 755 (1905); Pennsylvania R.R. v. State, 188 Md.
646, 53 A.2d 562 (1947); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. State, 81 Md. 371,
32 A. 201 (1895); Lipski v. Boston Elevated Ry., 248 Mass. 508, 143
N.E. 335 (1924); Davis v. Concord & M. R.R., 68 N.H. 247, 44 A. 388
(1894).
76 See note, Evidence, Negligence, Admissibility of Safety Rules of Other
Railroads, 23 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 506-8 (1954). Cf. Reed v. Missouri-Kan-
sas-Texas R.R., 362 Mo. 1, 239 S.W.2d 328 (1951) where rules of associa-
tion of american railroads were held admissible when the defendant
railroad company was a member and knew of them. Contra: Epstein,
Henning & Co. v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 4 Tenn. App. 412 (1926).
On custom generally see Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 Cal. L.
Rev. 1147 (1942); PROSSER, TORTS, § 32 at 135 (2d ed. 1955); 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 461 (3d ed. 1940).
77 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS, § 17.3 at 981 (1956).
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It would seem that such a conclusion would have to be based
upon the assumption that the course of conduct chosen either
through habit or as a formal rule was the result of an actual de-
cision that it was reasonably safer so to act. Such a viewpoint
was taken earlier in this article when company rules were con-
sidered as admissions of the company making them.7 8 Habit, on
the other hand, would be an admission of the individual who
formed it and would relate to what the actor considered to be
due care only if safety were a prime factor in the repetitious per-
formance of the conduct in question. The habit must have been
formed because the individual thought it to be more safe than
other possible conduct. It seems that problems would often arise
in determining just how important the safety considerations were,
especially since mere chance without much thought can form a
habit through repetition. Suffice it for our purposes to say that
stronger reasons exist for company rules being considered as ad-
missions since by definition they will be admitted into evidence
only when by their terms they can be interpreted as being de-
signed with safety in mind. The company would ordinarily not
pass such safety regulations without considering whether or not
they actually would promote safe operations, the choice of a par-
ticular mode of operation by chance being unlikely.
Also to be considered is the substantially greater ease with
which written safety rules can be proved as compared with the
various collateral issues likely to arise in attempting to prove
uniform prior conduct. Moreover the rules impose at least a con-
tractual duty of obedience which is lacking where a habit is self-
imposed. Thus without necessarily deciding whether evidence
of a habit should be admissible on the issue of due care, it can be
said, that while habit and safety rules are comparable, the reasons
for admitting the latter are decidedly more cogent.
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADMISSIBILITY
Those jurisdictions opposing admissibility of safety rules do
so on the basis of two principal objections: namely, the previously
discussed argument that the standard is set by the law, not by the
defendant;7 9 and the claim, now to be considered, that if rules are
admissible, potential defendants will be encouraged to "water
78 Supra note 42.
79 Supra note 61.
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down" or eliminate desirable rules.8 0 This latter reason is often
tersely stated as meaning that the more careful a man is, the more
likely he will be held liable. One underlying fallacy of such rea-
soning is the assumption that liability will follow automatically
from any violation of a rule. Technically, at least, such rules are
only evidence to be considered by the jury with all other evidence,
and they are not absolute standards. The defendant can argue
against them and even introduce evidence to show that a violation
of the rule was not negligence. Rules calling for more than is
reasonably necessary as a matter of law will be excluded by the
court.8 '
Underlying this objection is the feeling that admitting the rule
is similar to admitting evidence of repairs after an accident,"-
because defendant is given an apparent advantage if he is less
careful so that his subsequent exercise of greater care will not be
used against him. Public policy is said to favor not only the recti-
fication of dangerous conditions, but also the taking of every con-
ceivable precaution to prevent any and all damage to person and
property.8s However, the difference in the time of making the
80 Southern Ry. v. Allen, 88 Ga. App. 435, 77 S.E.2d 277 (1953) (The rules
were admitted on basis of stare decisis but the opinion writer dis-
agreed); Carter v. Sioux City Serv. Co., 160 Iowa 78, 141 N.W. 26
(1913); Hoffman v. Cedar Rapids & M.C. Ry., 157 Iowa 655, 139 N.E.
165 (1912) (a leading case); Louisville Ry. v. Gaugh, 133 Ky. 467, 118
S.W. 276 (1909); McKernan v. Detroit Citizen St. Ry., 138 Mich. 519,
101 N.W. 812 (1904); Isackson v. Duluth St. Ry., 75 Minn. 27, 27 N.W.
433 (1898); Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71 Minn. 438, 74 N.W. 166 (1898)
("falliciousness and unfairness. The more careful a man, the worse
off he is.") Taddeo v. Tilton, 248 App. Div. 290, 289 N.Y.S. 427 (1936);
Epstein, Henning & Co. v. Nashville, C & St. L. Ry., 14 Tenn. App.
412 (1926) [but see N.C. & St. Ry. v. Mayo, 14 Tenn. App. 28 (1931)
basing negligence on violation of a rule without discussing admis-
sibility]; Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Godsey, 117 Va. 167, 83 S.E.
1072 (1915). See note: Torts-Company Rules as Evidence of Negligence,
14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 621, supporting this public policy argument while
criticizing Hamilton v. City of Cleveland, 93 Ohio App. 93, 110 N.E.
2d 50 (1952). Infra note 109.
81 Infra note 99.
82 Rules are the same as repairs, Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71 Minn.
438, 74 N.W. 166 (1898); they are analagous, Virginia Ry. Power Co.
v. Godsey, 117 Va. 167, 83 S.E. 1072 (1915). Contra, they are dis-
tinguishable with subsequent safety changes possibly protecting from
accidents which before were unforeseen. Steven v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338 (1904).
83 On repairs generally see McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §§ 77, 252 (1954);
1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE, § 60 (Rev. Ed. Zipp,
1941); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 283 (3d ed. 1940).
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decision about being more careful readily distinguishes the repair
situation from the company rule situation. In the repair case an
injury has taken place. Liability is possible, and if evidence of
the repairs after the accident are admissible the potential defend-
ant hesitates to take any further precautions, not because this
may be used against him if another accident happens, but because
he would then be sure that this evidence could be used against
him in a case involving the accident which has already taken place
and which he can no longer prevent. Accordingly the courts re-
fuse to admit evidence of the repairs lest the potential defendant
be discouraged from greater care, possibly resulting in more in-
juries.
On the other hand, the 'company while considering the advis-
ability of adopting a safety rule has before it many different con-
siderations. No accident which has already happened will be
affected by the rule. Where danger exists and the company knows
or should know of it, the company must reckon with the possibility
that the very failure to make rules may be used against it.84 More-
over, it feels (whether justifiably so is immaterial since this feel-
ing appears to be prevalent) that as a large, impersonal "big
business" defendant, it is very likely to be held liable by the jury
for most accidents in any event. As a matter of fact in the area
of workmen's compensation law in which strict liability is imposed
for accidents happening within the scope of employment, s5 the
defendant knows he will be liable if an accident happens at all.
Thus the advantages to a company in making safety rules to pre-
vent as many accidents as possible will outweigh the possible dis-
advantages arising from the potential admission of the same rules
against them. This is especially true because the company should
realize there will not be many cases in which the verdict will
actually be decided solely on the basis of those rules.
Also, while the effect is uncertain, it seems logical that in-
surance carriers, as they become more mindful of the increasing
size of verdicts, should bring much pressure to bear upon insured
companies to encourage safer operations through better rules and
better rule enforcement. Since the insurance business includes
accident litigation, it will be in a position to make the detailed
analysis necessary to determine the relative advantages and dis-
advantages of adopting safety rules and will realize that its in-
sureds should adopt stringent rules and enforce them, thus tending
to offset any company reluctance to do so.
84 Supra note 36.
85 Infra note 137.
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Nor can it be assumed that management will be unaffected by
humanitarian principles dictating that it exercise its authority to
minimize the possibilities of harm. Despite the impersonal sound
of the words "company" and "management," these entities repre-
sent groups of individuals whose social values probably will lead
them to adopt rules with greater emphasis on the good that can
certainly be done rather than on some speculative harm which
might befall.
It would seem logical to believe that the admission of rules
in evidence will encourage their enforcement,80 and that the com-
panies' recognition of the necessities of self-preservation8 7 and
their concepts of their social obligations will prevent them from
downgrading their safety rules merely because of a fear that in
some future accident litigation they may be used against them.
The company too wishes to prevent accident and injury.
V. COMPLIANCE AS EVIDENCE OF DUE CARE
Very little authority can be found which indicates whether
or npt a safety rule may be introduced by the defendant, upon a
showing that the rule was followed, as some evidence that the
defendant was acting reasonably.8 The very same rule which
86 Bryan v. Southern Pac. Co., 79 Ariz. 253, 286 P.2d 761 (1955).
s7 Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Altemeier, 60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899).
88 In Fitzpatrick v. Bloomington City Ry., 73 Ill. App. 516 (1897), the
defendant's introduction of his own rules with evidence of compliance
therewith was held to be harmless error. But in Schmidt v. Chicago
City R.R., 239 Ill. 494, 88 N.E. 275 (1909) one of defendants railroads
was allowed to use the rules of both defendant railroads to show that
it had the right of way and the other defendant railroad did not.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Allen, 121 N.E. 329 (Ind. App. 1918), 189 Ind.
398, 126 N.E. 674 (1920) the appeal court only considered rules as
tending "to show the degree of care recognized by the one in charge
as necessary to render the particular place, appliance, or operation
safe," and they are 'competent evidence either for or against the
railroad company" (dictum). In Baltimore & Yorktown Turnpike
Road v. Leonhardt, 66 Md. 70, 5 A. 34"6 (1886) defendant was not
allowed to introduce his own rules. But in Hotenbrink v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 211 Mass. 77, 97 N.E. 624 (1912) the court seems to argue
that the absence of a rule indicated the absence of a duty. Admis-
sibility of a rule by defendant was denied in Eudy v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Lines, 183 S.C. 306, 191 S.E. 85 (1937); and there is dictum
that compliance will not absolve a defendant in Anastasio v. Hedges,
207 App. Div. 406, 202 N.Y.S. 109 (1923). St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry.
v. Wiggens, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 449, 107 S.W. 899 (1908) indicates
defendant could have introduced his rules, but there was no prejudice
in this case. In Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Godsey, 117 Va. 167,
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was admissible against the defendant in another case because he
failed to comply with it, or at least one potentially so admissible,
is involved; and the defendant naturally feels that if evidence of
breaking the rule is to be used against him, he should be given
the advantage of any favorable inference which may be drawn
from his not breaking it.89
Under one theory advanced for admissibility against the de-
fendant, namely that the rule is an admission by the company,90
the rules would not be properly admissible on its behalf since a
party cannot properly introduce his own prior statements to bolster
his present claim that he acted with due care. These prior declara-
tions are sel -serving and of questionable logical value. It adds
little or nothing to the defendant's claim of due care at the trial
to say that at a prior time he also took such a viewpoint.
It was assumed above that any probable disadvantage to the
company defendant which might accrue from admitting its rules
in evidence against it would be offset by the humanitarian and
practical business reasons for making adequate safety rules. 91
However, if the defendant could aid its own cause by making less
adequate rules and introducing them as some evidence of what is
due care, the possible reasons for "toning down" the rules become
more apparent, and the practical reasons previously discussed for
encouraging adequate rules become less compelling.92  I would
83 S.E. 1072 (1915) dictum to the effect that defendants cannot in-
troduce rules is given as one reason why plaintiff could not. Cf.
Pullman Co. v. Wan, 4 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1925) (cert. denied 269 U.S.
557) where a rule is used to show who is liable as between defendant
Pullman and defendant railroad. And in Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Ringstaff, 67 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1933) a rule is used to show a station
agent lacked authority to invite plaintiff to ride, so plaintiff was
a trespasser and thus was owed a much lesser duty by defendant.
89 It is interesting to note that in the report by the Real Estate Com-
mittee on Uniform Practices of the State Bar Association [Real Es-
tate title Standards, 12 Conn. B.J. 100 (1938)], the case of Hurley
v. Connecticut Co., 11 Conn. 276, 172 A. 86 (1934) is cited as au-
thority for the proposition that, on the assumption that the com-
mittee involved are all reasonable men, the acceptance and adoption
by their section of the annual meeting will make the title standards
admissible into evidence on the issue of what is reasonableness in
examining abstracts. The suggestion advanced is that any member
could come forward as an expert and testify that compliance is rea-
sonable.
90 Supra note 42.
91 Supra notes 79-87.
92 Ibid.
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still hesitate to say that admissibility on behalf of the defendant
would actually cause less care and greater harm, but if there is
any merit in the argument which says that this will happen if
the rules can be used against defendants, the reasons for saying
it apply with even greater force if the rules could be used to help
escape liability.
As far as the employee defendant himself is concerned, the
rules can still be considered as a circumstance under which he
acts, since he would, as a reasonable man, consider them before
acting. Such rules, unless obviously inadequate, would tend to
indicate what is a reasonable way for the employee to act, especially
where the rules involve technical considerations not known to
the employee so that he must rely on his employer. However, the
company has known all along that, as a practical consideration,
it will usually be the defendant in these cases because of its greater
resources and the consequently less sympathetic attitude of the
jury. Our policy discussion of the preceding paragraph is again
applicable, and policy seems to favor not admitting the rules.
Of course, where an employer is alleged to have been negligent
in failing to adopt adequate rules, the rules which he has adopted
should be admissible by him to show to what extent his rules
actually go, violation or compliance not being relevant for this
purpose.93 However, suppose that because of this allegation of
inadequacy the employee and his employer acquire different in-
terests in the rules. Once plaintiff has pleaded and attempted to
prove that the rules are inadequate, the employer is forced to
argue that the rules are in fact adequate. Should the employee
be allowed to argue that even if the jury finds the rules to be
inadequate for the company, it was still not negligent for him to
act under the rule in reliance upon the greater technical facilities
of his employer? An employer could have greater knowledge of
danger, either because of its greater all-around "know-how," or
because of its information about prior accidents, or because it has
a duty to know. In these limited situations it would seem reason-
able to allow the employee to use the rule as some evidence of his
own due care if the danger is such that he might not have recog-
nized it, even if the adequacy of the rules has been questioned by
the plaintiff.
93 Supra note 36.
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VI. IRRELEVANT RULES
A. WRITTEN RuLE LnMTATION
So far the types of safety rules which can be introduced into
evidence have been discussed in general terms. However, even
in jurisdictions permitting their use, well-defined limitations have
been placed upon the types of rules which are properly admissible
and the conditions under which they are admissible. The definition
of "safety rules," as used in this paper, was specifically limited to
"written rules." There is case law so limiting them,94 and this
can be inferred from the fact that almost all cases concern only
those rules which were in writing. One reason for this is the in-
herent difficulty of proving oral regulations, especially where the
correct interpretation of a given rule may hinge upon one or two
words which may be lost through less reliable parol evidence.
The formality of putting rules into writing is also some assurance
that management has given them the due consideration which is
implied by the use of rules as admissions." Likewise, where rele-
vant, the adequacy of notice to the employee is more readily prov-
able if it is in writing.
B. PuRPosE LIMITATION
Another limitation which is a part of the definition of safety
rules is that their purpose be, at least to some extent, the preven-
tion of accidents as opposed to mere operating advantage or con-
venience.90 Consider the case where the defendant's rule set a
twenty-five mile per hour speed limit for freight trains. Plain-
tiff's automobile was struck by one of defendant's trains which was
exceeding this speed, but the defendant argued that the purpose
of the speed limit was not the prevention of accidents at crossings.
In such circumstances, the Massachusetts court held that it is not
to be presumed that the purpose of the rule was to protect cross-
ings, since it is common knowledge that other trains go faster and
04 St. Louis A. & T. H. R.R. v. Bauer, 156 Ill. 106, 40 N.E. 448 (1895);
Gerry v. Worchester Consol. St. Ry., 248 Mass. 559, 143 N.E. 694 (1924).
Contra, Garcia v. San Diego Elec. Ry., 75 Cal. App. 2d 729, 170 P.2d
957 (1946) where oral regulations considered upon the issue of con-
tributory negligence.
0 Supra note 42.
96 In actual effect this may be the same as the later discussed limita-
tion that the rule be designed to protect this person from this harm.
Infra note 106. However, the safety rule limitation would be more
broad, leaving many rules which would in fact be inadmissible for
other reasons.
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thus reasonable to assume the rule was intended to protect freight
trains or for other operating purposes.9 7  Such reasoning seems
to be somewhat tenuous under the circumstances, and is about as
far as a court can go in excluding rules for this reason. 9
C. CONFLICT LIIITATION
Where a particular jurisdiction has once decided that certain
conduct is or is not reasonable as a matter of law, rules contro-
verting such standards would ordinarily not be admissible since
they are unreasonable as a matter of law.99 For example: a rule
97 Peterson v. Boston & M. R.R., 310 Mass. 45, 36 N.E.2d 701 (1941).
But see Campagna v. Market Street Ry., 143 P.2d 43 (Cal. App. 1943)
aff'd without mentioning rules in 24 Cal.2d 304, 149 P.2d 281 where
the defendant unsuccessfully argued that its own speed limits were
designed to save wear and tear on the tracks, a view accepted by
the dissent however.
98 Other cases refusing to admit particular rules as not being safety
rules include Nelson v. Southern Pac. Co., 8 Cal.2d 648, 67 P.2d 682
(1937); Deister v. Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry., 99 Kan. 525, 162 P. 282
(1917); Derosier v. New Eng. Tel. and Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 130 A.
145 (1925); Chabott v. Grand Trunk Ry., 77 N.H. 133, 88 A. 995; Kras-
now v. National Airlines, 228 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955). The Derosier
case supra extends this concept to the limit.
99 In Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry. v. Ryan, 165 Ill. 88, 46 N.E. 208 (1896)
a rule forbidding passing stopped trains while they are unloading
passengers was held to be immaterial since the fact that the train
passed at twenty-five miles per hour was negligent of itself [to same
effect on passing stopped trains at high speeds see Baltimore & 0.
R.R. v. State, 81 Md. 371, 32 A. 201 (1895)]. In Southern Ry. v. Adkins
Adm'r, 133 Ky. 219, 117 S.W. 321 (1909) a rule pertaining to the handling
of nitroglycerne was held admissible, but the case appears to be one
of negligence per se. In Bilodeau v. Fitchberg & L. St. Ry., 236
Mass. 526, 128 N.E. 872 (1920) a rule saying, "No excuse will be received
for rear end collisions" was held inadmissible. In Gagnon v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 483, 91 'N.E. 875 (1910) a rule requiring con-
ductors to stand on back steps to keep people from boarding moving
trains was held inadmissible since the railroad has no duty to protect
the public from such obvious risks. In Crowley v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 204 Mass. 241, 90 N.E. 532 (1910) a rule requiring keeping chains
fastened across open platforms held not to apply to trains coming to a
stop, citing prior cases holding it was not negligent to go through and
unfasten all the chains just before stopping. In Barney v. Hannibal &
St. J. Ry., 126 Mo. 372, 28 S.W. 1069 (1894) held railroad had no duty
to trespassing children beyond what it did, so rule requiring employees
to keep them off the premise was inadmissible. A rule in Anstine v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 342 Pa. 423, 20 A.2d 774 (1941) requiring ability
to stop to avoid anything held to set too high a standard. And in
Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Lampman, 18 Wyo. 106, 104 P. 533 (1912)
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will sometimes cover the same conduct as a statute, with each
prescribing a different course of conduct. 0 0 In a jurisdiction
where the violation of a statute is negligence per se, any rule re-
quiring less care than the statute would be inadmissible since the
statute sets the minimum standard.10' However, even in these
jurisdictions compliance with a statute is not due care as a matter
of law, so the jury could in all jurisdictions properly consider rules
which require more care than the statute.102 It follows that com-
pliance with a statute coupled with violation of a rule could be
negligent. This is a reasonable result since statutes do not cover
every detail of every operation. Of course, where any type of
governmental regulation is considered only as some evidence of
due care, it is not a contradiction to allow the fact finder to consider
both the regulation and the rule.
Next consider the rule which is couched in terms of a degree
of care which is higher than that set by the legal standard, e.g.,
a rule requiring a man to be as careful as possible or to exercise
extreme care. 03 The only time such a rule should be introduced
the court says that if a prior case indicates as a matter of law that
certain conduct is not negligent, then a rule forbidding that conduct
is inadmissible; the rule in question requiring going through trains
to see to it that all passengers were off, while cases indicate stopping
for a sufficient length of time was enough.
100 A statute specifically allowing buses to stop upon highway when there
was a view of three hundred feet in each direction makes inadmis-
sible a rule requiring buses to pull off the highway. Waddell v.
Crescent Motors, Inc., 260 Ala. 124, 69 So.2d 414 (1953). In Folsom
Morris Coal Mining Co. v. Scott, 107 Okla. 178, 231 P. 512 (1924)
a rule contrary to one statute was excluded, while one following
another was admitted. See Hubb Diggs Co. v. Bell, 297 S.W. 682
(Tex.Civ.App. 1926) where one reason given for keeping out of evi-
dence a speed limit imposed by the chief of police upon motorcycle
police was the execption to speed limits granted by statute to emer-
gency vehicles. The court also indicated that exceeding thirty-five
miles was reasonable as a matter of law anyway.
101 See generally note 63 supra.
102 When defendant sought to exclude rule as requiring more cars than
statute, the rule was held inadmissible in Campagna v. Market Street
Ry., 143 P.2d 43 (Cal.App. 1934), aff'd without discussion of rules
in 24 Cal.2d 304, 149 P.2d 281. A later California case also indicates
a jury question remains despite compliance with a statute, since
statutes set only minimum standards. Pennington v. Southern Pac.
Co., 146 Cal.App.2d 605, 304 P.2d 22 (1956).
103 Rules requiring "every precaution" held inadmissible in Alabama
Great Southern Ry. v. Clark, 136 Ala. 450, 34 So. 917 (1903); and
"highest degree of control" held inadmissible in Otto v. Milwaukee
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is when it singles out a particular location or situation and the
rule is introduced solely to show notice of knowledge of danger.
Even then great care must be used properly to limit its use.1" 4
The reasons for this are the same as those discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph. These rules also call for conduct which the
jury could not consider to be necessary under the circumstances.
D. INTERPRETATION LIMITATION
Another generally recognized limitation placed upon safety
rules is the same as that applied to statutes, 10 5 namely, that the
regulation must be intended to protect a group of persons, of which
plaintiff is a member, from the type of accident or injury which
happened. 10 6 Reasons for such limitations are found in the negli-
gence law concerning foreseeability and causation. Under the
general test of foreseeability, while it varies somewhat in different
jurisdictions, a person must be able to reasonably foresee the harm-
Northern Ry., 148 Wis. 54, 134 N.W. 157 (1912). See the rule in
Isackson v. Duluth St. Ry., 75 Minn. 27, 77 N.W. 433 (1898) in which
a rule which made motorman responsible for any damage would be
inadmissible under this theory. Contra, Larsen v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 212 Mass. 262, 87 N.E. 1048 (1912) although the rule probably was
not considered from this point of view.
104 Supra note 10.
105 Supra note 62, 63.
106 In Burg v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 90 Iowa 106, 57 N.W. 680 (1894)
rules pertaining to the lookout required by extra trains to avoid
hitting "work trains, section men and others who may be obstructing
the track" held to pertain to the protection of passengers and trains,
not trespassers such as plaintiffs deceased. The rule in Louisville
& M. R.R. v. Howards Adm'r, 82 Ky. 212 (1884) was also held to be
intended to protect passengers, not trespassers. Plaintiff did not
belong to the class sought to be protected in Ouelette v. Bethlehem-
Hingham Shipyard, 321 Mass. 390, 73 N.E.2d 592 (1947). In Binder v.
Boston Elevated Ry., 265 Mass. 589, 164 N.E. 441 (1929) a rule requiring
the sound of a gong before starting was held to be for the protection
of others than passengers fully on car, it not being negligent to start
before the passengers fully seated. The rule requiring the closing of the
door between the car and the front platform was held in Longacre
v. Yonkers R.R., 236 N.Y. 119, 140 N.E. 215 (1923) to be intended
to keep the motorman from being bothered, not to keep children
like plaintiff from falling off. In Anstine v. Pennsylvania R.R., 342
Pa. 423, 20 A.2d 774 (1941), a rule pertaining to stopping distances
was held to be designed to prevent running into other trains, not
to cars at crossings. See also Universe Tankship v. Pyrate Tank
Cleaners, 152 F.Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also the cases cited
in note 97 supra and notes 110-113 infra since many cases could fit
into anyone of these notes.
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ful consequences of his action before the act can be considered as
being negligent. 10 7 Unless at the time when the safety rule was
adopted it was reasonably calculated to protect the type of person
who was injured from the type of injury he received, it would be
difficult to say that the rule indicated that the rule maker foresaw
possibly harmful results of a violation. Such a rule would be
irrelevant and not an admission of the company defendant. A
rule may well have other purposes, but unless this particular pro-
tection is inherent in the rule, foreseeability is lacking.10 8 It is the
same for the person who actually violates the rule. Unless it is
reasonably understandable that the results which did occur could
have been prevented or made less likely by obeying the rule, there
is no negligence in violating it insofar as the consequences under
consideration are concerned. Where the employees themselves
are concerned, the rules serve as notice of danger in many situa-
tions and will thus tend to make unfortunate consequences more
foreseeable.
Closely related to the just mentioned problem are the cases
in which the courts have held a particular rule inadmissible be-
cause the violation of it did not cause the injury. Even if the rule
had been obeyed, the accident still would have happened.'0 9 In
107 MORRIS, TORTS 179 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS 259 (2d ed. 1955).
108 Consider Tall v. Baltimore Steam-Packet Co., 90 Mo. 248, 44 A. 1007
(1899). A rule forbade card playing, it was violated, an argument
issued, a gun was pulled, the captain sought to take the gun away,
the gun went off and plaintiff, a bystander, was injured. Held, the
rule was inadmissible since the sequence of events was not forseeable.
Quaere: Was this a safety rule at all? See note 96 supra.
109 In Krasnow v. National Airlines, 228 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955) the
violation of a rule prohibiting passengers from drinking from their
own bottle was held not to have caused plaintiffs injury from flying
glass since there was other glass thrown about when the winds tossed
the airplane. In Hamilton v. City of Cleveland, 93 Ohio App. 93,
110 N.E.2d (1952) a rule forbidding passengers talking to operators
was violated by a person showing the operator a gun, which acci-
dently discharged hitting a passenger. The majority held the rule
admissible since if the rule were obeyed the accident would not
have happened, with a strong dissent to the effect that violation
of the rule did not cause the misfiring of the gun. This holding and
admissibility in general are severely criticized in the note: Torts-
Company Rules as Evidence of Negligence, 14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 621
(1953). The failure to announce a station was held not to have caused
the injury in Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Lampman, 18 Wyo. 106, 104
P. 533 (1912) since plaintiff admitted knowing she had arrived at
her destination. On the issue of whether speed alone would cause
an accident, the court in Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 128 Cal. App.
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these circumstances, violation of the rule neither caused the ac-
cident nor was the accident foreseeable. The rule violation was
merely an accidental circumstance which should be excluded as
irrelevant.
The factual situation in which a rule will become operative
must be substantially the same as the circumstances to which the
rule by its terms applies. 110 This limitation applies generally re-
gardless of the theory of admissibility since an admission is limited
by the terms of the declaration, and a reasonable man would only
follow a rule bearing on the circumstances under which he acts.
This question as to whether a particular rule applies to the cir-
cumstances as they existed at the time of the accident becomes
quite involved in a number of cases and has caused some courts
much trouble. The court has to decide that the rule applies to the
person who is alleged to have violated it and that it purports to
govern conduct in a situation existing at the time of the accident."'
As the cases cited indicate, this involves many of the same prob-
567, 18 P.2d 97 (1933) said that if the train had obeyed the speed
limit that it was not reasonable to assume the accident would not
have happened. Plaintiff's deceased had been killed when the
truck in which he was riding went behind one train and was hit
by another going somewhere between twenty-five and sixty miles
per hour. But in Davis v. Concord & M. R.R., 68 N.H. 247, 44 A. 388
(1894) where a train was going forty to fifty miles an hour when
the limit was fifteen, the rule was held admissible since if the rule
was obeyed there was reason to believe the accident would not have
happened. See generally PROSSER, TORTS, Ch. 9 (2d ed. 1955).
110 Carter v. Pennsylvania R.R., 172 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1949); Wabash
RR. v. Keller, 127 Ill. App. 265 (1906); Wabash R.R. v. Humphrey,
127 Ill. App. 334 (1906); Poole v. Boston & M. R.R., 216 Mass. 12,
102 N.E. 918 (1913); Smith v. Boston & M. R.R., 88 N.H. 430, 190 A. 697,
191 A. 833 (1937). See also Tefft v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry., 116
Conn. 127, 163 A. 762 (1933); Clevland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Davis,
56 Ill. App. 41 (1894); Blevins v. Houston Electric Co., 235 S.W. 987
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921); St. Louis, S.F., & T. Ry. v. Armstrong, 166
S.W. 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Laeve v. Missouri K. & T. Ry.,
136 S.W. 1129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); and the dissent in Airline Motor
Coaches v. Caver, 148 Tex. 521, 226 S.W.2d 830 (1950). But see
Kirkdoffer v. St. Louis, San Francisco Ry., 327 Mo. 166, 37 S.W.2d
569 (1931) for a strained case of inapplicability to aid a defendant
against an obviously careless plaintiff.
"I While admissibility as such is properly the function of the judge
even when fact determination is necessary (9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2550 (3d ed. 1940)] applicability of a rule to the set of facts was
left to the jury in Georgia N. Ry. v. Hathcock, 93 Ga. App. 72,
91 S.E.2d 145 (1945).
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lems considered in interpreting statutes. No general rules can be
stated. It is primarily a question of logic 112 and semantics.113
E. T=ME LIMITATION
Some courts have excluded rules upon the grounds that they
were not in force at the time of the accident. 114 If considered as
112 Despite the obvious difficulty in any attempt to catagorize the dif-
ferent reasons particular rules do not apply, consider the simple
logical analysis necessary in this note and the following one to deter-
mine whether a rule is applicable to the situation. In Sinopoli v.
Chicago Ry., 316 Ill. 609, 147 N.E. 487 (1925) defendant sought to in-
troduce a rule requiring keeping doors closed but the court held
it did not apply since plaintiff had alleged injury from the starting
up of the car while she was outside the doors and stepping off the
bottom step. In Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Procter, 122 Ky. 92, 89 S.W.
714 (1906) a rule requiring that trains keep five minutes apart was
held to apply only to trains on the same track, not to where one
train was on the siding. And in Horye v. Boston Elevated Ry., 256
Mass. 493, 152 N.E. 738 (1926) the rule giving fire apparatus the
right of way was held inapplicable to trucks returning from a fire.
Quaere: where a rule requires an engineer to sound a whistle when
he sees a car approaching, could it be admissible when the plaintiff
has alleged he could not see the train, since the engineer could then
not logically have seen the plaintiff? The rule was held admissible
under these circumstances, however, in Callaway v. Pickard, 68
Ga. App. 637, 23 S.E.2d 564 (1942).
113 McGinnes v. Shaw, 46 Ga. App. 248, 167 S.E. 533 (1933) limits rules
to their "clear meaning." A rule pertaining to "picking cars" is
inapplicable to where engine and tender crossed tracks. Central of
Georgia Ry. v. Coper, 45 Ga. App. 806, 165 S.E. 858 (1932). A train
was not being "unloaded" or "pushed" in Nadeau v. Trustees of New
York. N.H. & H. R.R., 310 Mass, 717, 39 N.E.2d 669 (1942). A rule
forbidding the passing of standing cars would not apply once train
has started. Mercier v. Union St. Ry., 230 Mass. 397, 119 N.E. 764
(1918). The rule was to be admissible on a new trial if the combination
involved proved to be a "train" in Minot v. Boston & M. R.R., 73
N.H. 317, 61 A. 509 (1905). A rule pertaining to "switching" does
not apply when switching completed and train returing to barn.
Burroughs v. Southern Pac. Co., 153 Ore. 431, 56 P.2d 1145 (1936).
A rule requiring the conductor to help "elderly and feeble" people
to board defendant's train does not pertain to a plaintiff who denies
being either. Shepman v. United Electric Ry., 70 R. I. 454, 40 A.2d
730 (1944). And a rule pertaining to "shifting cars" is inapplicable
to entire unit being pushed some distance. Waid v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry., 14 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1926).
114 McCartney v. City of Washington, 124 Iowa 382, 100 N.W. 80 (1904);
St. Louis, S.F. & T. Ry. v. Andrews, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 426, 99 S.W.
871 (1906). Whether they are in force is not a jury question according
to Holder v. Key System, 88 Cal. App. 2d 925, 200 P.2d 98 (1948)
and Yost v. Union Pac. R.R., 245 Mo. 246, 149 S.W. 577 (1912). In
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admissions the rules adopted after the accident would seem to be
a recognition that such rules are feasible and are necessary to
prevent similar accidents from recurring. However, our earlier
distinction between the evidence of subsequent repairs and rules,
and our discussion of the policy reasons for keeping only the fact
of repairs out of evidence are not applicable here. 1  The accident
has happened, and admissibility of a rule in pending litigation may
affect the decision of whether to adopt a new or better rule. More-
over, the knowledge acquired from the accident may give rise to
a greater duty in the future. Thus, the rules may be relevant in
future accidents, but not to this one. When a rule was adopted
and then rejected before the accident, the company should not be
held to have made an admission because, without regard to the
pending suit, the company has rejected the rule as being undesir-
able. Nor should any rule not in effect at the time of the accident
be admissible against the employee since it was not a circumstance
which a reasonable man would normally consider.
There is one exception to the requirement of contemporaneous
existence between the rule and the accident. That is the case
where the plaintiff knew of the prior rule and relied upon its
being carried out. 1 6 However, the change must have been com-
paratively recent and the plaintiff's lack of knowledge must be
without any fault of his own.
VII. INSTRUCTIONS, WEIGHT, AND EFFECT UPON
JURY IN GENERAL
The procedural matters covered in this section depend upon
general considerations too lengthy and complicated for any com-
plete analysis of their relation to company rules. The rules of law
pertaining to instructions (when they should be given and when
a party must specifically request them) and to weight (when to
direct a verdict and when the jury's verdict is properly supported)
are laws unto themselves. It is sufficient for purposes of this
Paquin v. St. Louis & Sub. Ry., 90 Mo. App. 118 (1901) rules in force
prior to the accident were presumed to still be in force since defendant
had peculiar knowledge if they were not And see Dougherty v.
Philadelphia R.R., 171 Pa. 457, 33 A. 340 (1895) when rules in
force by their terms but not yet distributed were held inadmissible.
Quaere: is there a possibility here that defendant was negligent in
failing to promulgate safety rules. See note 36 supra.
115 Supra notes 82 and 83.
116 Supra note 22 on reliance in general and note 75 on a similar law as to
prior custom.
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article to note that the conclusions about admissibility reached
herein should be applied to the particular procedural rules of in-
dividual jurisdictions. A few general comments may, however,
be appropriate.
Any instruction making a rule an absolute standard is re-
versible error' 17 unless considerations other than the mere exist-
ence of the rule indicate that a violation of the rule is negligence." s
Instructions limiting the jury's consideration of the rules would
normally be appropriate, 119 although the defendant may have a
burden of making a request to that effect. 20  Even rules improp-
erly admitted, perhaps because part of the foundation for ad-
missibility is not subsequently proven, can be the subject of an
instruction which will cure any error.' 2 ' However, where the
rules are not admitted for a particular purpose, e.g., to show knowl-
edge of danger or feasibility of safeguards, but are merely some
evidence of negligence, there is authority holding that no special
instruction on the effect of the rules is necessary nor can one be
obtained by asking. 22 It seems that this gives plaintiff's counsel
a rather strong advantage in arguing the rules to the jury, even
though defense counsel does have a limited opportunity to object
to errors in argument.
Where weight of evidence is the problem, a violation of the
rules alone has been held to be insufficient to serve as the basis
117 Southern Ry. v. Allen, 88 Ga. App. 435, 77 S.E.2d 277 (1953); Anstine
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 342 Pa. 423, 20 A.2d 774 (1941). Cf. Phillips v.
Montgomery Ward Co., 125 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1942) for comments
close to an absolute standard.
11S Texas & P. Ry. v. Hilgartner, 149 S.W. 1091 (Tex.Civ.App. 1912)
when violation of rules plus all other competent evidence entitled
plaintiff to a binding instruction on the rules. Cf. Couthern Traction
Co. v. Wilson, 187 S.W. 536 (Tex.Civ.App. 1916).
11 Southern Pac. Co .v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1942) Cert. denied
317 U.S. 676; Standard Oil Co. v. Allen, 121 N.E. 329, rehearing denied
123 N.E. 693 (Ind.App. 1918). See also Hobbs v. Eastern R.R., 66 Me.
572 (1876).
120 Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 315 Mo. 987, 288 S.W. 777
(1926).
121 Pennsylvania Co. v. Reidy, 198 Ill. 9, 64 N.E. 698 (1902).
122 Davis v. Johnson, 128 Cal. App.2d 466, 275 P.2d 563 (1954); Chicago
City Ry. v. Lowitz, 218 Ill. 24, 75 N.E. 755 (1905); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. State, 188 Md. 646, 53 A.2d 562 (1947), 190 Md. 586, 59 A.2d 190
(1948).
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of a verdict against the defendant. 123 It is difficult to understand
how rules, if properly admitted, would be the only evidence of
negligence. It was stated earlier that before a rule is admissible,
it must be such as is reasonably calculated to prevent harm. -1 2 4
Harm has resulted from a violation, and the rules are admitted as
an admission, as a circumstance of the accident, or more likely as
both. If the rule is such that it could be considered reasonable,
then a violation thereof must be such that it could be considered
unreasonable. If reasonable men could so decide, then it is a
fact question for the fact finder. If the court should have directed
a verdict, it was not because the violation of the rule by itself was
insufficient, but because the conduct involved was not negligent
as a matter of law. The rule requiring other conduct was im-
properly admitted in the first place since it called for conduct
which was unreasonable or unnecessary as a matter of law. This
situation may not become known until all the plaintiff's evidence
or, possibly, the evidence of both parties is in. There will, how-
ever, always be evidence other than the rules since the facts which
constituted the violation of the rules will be shown, the issue being
whether these facts show negligence. The rules are an aid in de-
termining this.
There are a few cases (some in jurisdictions not allowing ad-
mission of rules) which have held that under the circumstances,
although it was error to have allowed the introduction of the rules,
the error was not prejudicial.12 5 Unquestionably some of these
cases involved situations where the court would have been willing
123 Foster v. Southern Ry., 42 Ga. App. 830, 157 S.E. 371 (1931); Lake
Shore & M.S. R.R. v. Ward, 135 Ill. 511, 26 N.E. 520 (1891); Gagnon v.
Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 483, 91 N.E. 875 (1910); Hoops v.
Thompson, 357 Mo. 1160, 212 S.E.2d 730 (1948); Foster v. Kansas
City Ry., 235 S.W. 1070 (1921). Cf. Baily v. Worcester Consol. St.
Ry., 228 Mass. 477, 117 N.E. 824 (1917); Pierce v. Worcester Consol.
St. Ry., 233 Mass. 310, 123 N.E. 773 (1919). Possibly contra Leavitt v.
Boston Elevated Ry., 222 Mass. 346, 110 N.E. 961 (1916); Delaware, L.
& W. R.R. v. Ashley, 67 F. 209 (3d Div. 1895).
124 Supra note 96.
125 Bailey v. Market St. Ry., 3 Cal. App.2d 525, 40 P.2d 281 (1935);
Hart v. Cedar Rapids, & M.C. Ry., 109 Iowa 631, 80 N.W. 662 (1899)
(that defendants mentioned them first); Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Vaughn's Adm'r, 183 Ky. 829, 210 S.W. 938 (1919); Brown v. Detroit
United Ry., 179 Mich. 404, 146 N.W. 278 (1914); Blevins v. Houston
Elec. Co., 235 S.W. 987 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). See note 27 supra
for possible changes in California and Kentucky law. Contra Isackson
v. Duluth St. Ry., 75 Minn. 27, 77 N.W. 433 (1898) (reversed on rules
alone); Gillespie v. Great Northern Ry., 127 Minn. 234, 149 N.W. 302
(1914).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
to direct the verdict for the plaintiff anyway, at least on the issue
of liability. 126 Typically the court notes all that the defendant did
which it should not have done or all that it did not do which it
should have done, and then decides that the violation of the rule
adds nothing. Yet some courts have argued against admissibility
on the ground that once the jury decides that a rule was not com-
plied with, the defendant will be held liable, i.e., these courts feel
that undue weight will be placed upon any violation. The fact
that other courts disallow the rules but say in the same breath
that admission is not prejudicial indicates either that they feel
such weight will not be given, or else they may even favor ad-
missibility.127
Moreover, if the jury does give rather great weight to a viola-
tion, can the court say that as a matter of law an admission of a
party should not weigh heavily or that a jury should not feel that
an employee who violates a rule designed to protect himself and
those with whom he comes in contact is in all likelihood acting
negligently? There is at least reason for saying that at this point
the defendant had better "start talking" if he wants to avoid liabil-
ity. The arguments the defendant can use to show that violation
of the rule is not negligence are discussed elsewhere in this
article. 1
28
126 Compare Southern Ry. v. Adkins Adm'r, 133 Ky. 219, 117 S.W. 321
(1909) and Southern Ry. v. Stewart, 141 Ky. 270, 132 S.W. 435 (1910).
Both involve the same accident in which explosives aboard defendant's
trains caused the injuries complained of. Defendants detailed rules
as to inspecting and safeguarding explosives were apparently com-
pletely disregarded. In the Adkins case, the rules were held admis-
sible but without citing authority. In the Stewart case they were
held inadmissible, but the court said there was no prejudicial error.
In both cases, the court was obviously impressed with the total
lack of safeguadrs. See also Cincinnati, N. 0. & T.P. Ry. v. Ackerman,
148 Ky. 435, 146 S.W. 1113 (1912) where the court held there was
no prejudicial error since the negligence was so gross and apparent.
127 California cases after the Bailey case (supra note 126) indicate rules
are admissible. See Powell v. Pacific Electric Ry., 35 Cal.2d 40,
216 P.2d 448 (1950). In Kentucky after the cases cited supra in notes
125 and 126, a case was dismissed partly because rules were admitted.
Louisville v. N. R.R. v. Stidham's Adm'r, 187 Ky. 139, 218 S.W.
460 (1920). But in Louisville R.R. v. Whitaker, 222 Ky. 302, 300
SW. 912 (1927) rules were admitted for questionable reasons and by
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Gregory, 279 Ky. 295, 130 S.W.2d 745 (1939)
a speed limit was distinguished from the types of rules in prior
cases and held admissible as an admission.
128 Defendant can argue a rule is unreasonable (supra note 99), inap-
plicable [supra notes 110 to 113], and so on.
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VIII. RULES TO PROVE AN ACT
Suppose that what the defendant was actually doing at the
time of the accident is in question, and the defendant seeks to
introduce his own rule-either a safety rule or an operating rule-
to aid in proving what he did. Presumably the plaintiff or some
other witness has testified that the conduct was something other
than that which the rule prescribes. Obviously comparisons could
be made with the habit area of the law. However, it is not my
purpose, at least at this time, to discuss the probative value of a
habit to show the happening of an event. Thus, it is sufficient for
present considerations to point out that, where prior acts repeated-
ly done in compliance with the rule are introduced as evidence
tending to show what was done at the time in question, the reason-
ing applied to rules in this area is identical to that used in the habit
area. The usual habit rule is that general habits, such as always
being careful or of always being a good driver, are not normally
admissible, 2 9 but as a habit becomes more narrow, pertaining to
a single place and circumstance in issue, there is a tendency to
recognize a greater probative value and to admit evidence of the
habit into evidence. 30 As applied to company rules, this means
that if prior repeated obedience to all rules is shown, this general
habit of following rules would not be admissible, but that as the
observance of a single rule with a great degree of regularity is
shown, the probative value increases, or at least so the law of habit
would seem to indicate.
There has been little analysis and little agreement by the
courts in the few cases involving rules as proof of an act. A rule
setting a speed limit has been held inadmissible as evidence of the
speed at which defendant's train was traveling.' 3 ' Yet when the
issue was where the defendant's train actually stopped, rules per-
taining to where they were supposed to stop have been admitted. 132
129 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 153 et seq. (1954); 1 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE, § 65 (3d ed. 1940). Both writers prefer the term "character"
for these general habits.
130 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 162 (1954); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 92 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
131 Anastasio v. Hedges, 207 App. Div. 406, 202 N.Y.S. 109 (1923).
132 Bailey v. Market St. Ry., 3 Cal. App.2d 525, 40 P.2d 281 (1935); Mof-
fitt v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 527, 86 A. 16 (1913); Jackson v. Grand
Ave. Ry., 118 Mo. 199, 24 S.W. 192 (1893); contra West Chicago St.
R.R. v. Brown, 112 Ill. App. 351 (1904). See also Sinopoli v. Chicago
Ry., 316 Ill. 609, 147 N.E. 487 (1925); Moore v. Woonsocket St. Ry.,
27 R.I. 450, 63 A. 313 (1906). Plaintiff introduced rules to show where
the train stopped to prove he had gotten off a stopped train in Nassau
Electric Ry. v. Corliss, 126 F. 355 (2d Cir. 1903).
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Likewise where the issue was how defendant's car was parked,
a rule requiring parallel parking was held to have been properly
introduced. 33 But where defendant has denied there was any
accident, a rule requiring an accident report has been held inad-
missible.' 3 ' There is seldom any reference in these cases to an
analogy with the law of habit, yet the basis for comparison seems
quite clear.
Apart from any attempt to establish habit by proof that a
particular rule has been complied with on numerous occasions, the
rule should be considered by itself and a determination made of
whether the fact that a rule was known to the employee has suf-
ficient relation to proof of what did in fact happen to be admissible
to prove that issue. There are numerous reasons for arguing that
an employee will usually obey the rules of his employer: he has
a contractual duty to do so; he wants to be on good terms with
his boss; he wants to keep his job; he does not want to risk injury
to himself; he does not want to harm his fellow employees or third
persons; and he might just as well follow the prescribed course
as to arbitrarily adopt some other. With these sound reasons for
obedience, it can be argued that, in the absence of specific proof
to the contrary, there is a strong presumption that a rule was
followed on any given occasion.
Assume for purposes of further discussion that it can be shown
that rules are obeyed ninety-nine per cent of the time in applicable
situations. Exact figures are not necessary for present purposes
unless obedience would be so likely that proof of the rule could
be considered as absolute proof of the act. The cases throughout
this article indicate that rules are disobeyed, but a visit to any
railroad yard will indicate that they are obeyed enough to show
that safety rules do have a tremendous effect on the way em-
ployees act. It is possible to assume that rules are followed in
ninety-nine per cent of the situations to which they are applicable.
Next, suppose an accident is witnessed by three persons: the
plaintiff who describes conduct in violation of a rule, the defendant
who claims he obeyed it, and a disinterested third person who
agrees with plaintiff. The rule has not yet been introduced, but
defendant seeks to do so to bolster his case. Even assuming that
rules are complied with in almost all cases, can it be said that
'33 Keohn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106, 206 N.W. 19 (1925).
134 Becker v. Buffalo L. E. Traction Co., 52 Pa. Super, Ct. 93 (1812);
Hardin v. Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry., 49 Tex. Civ. App 184, 108 S.W.
490 (1908).
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF DEFENDANT'S SAFETY RULES 949
the likelihood of obedience in this case bears any close relation-
ship to the statistical likelihood of obedience? Although disobe-
dience was assumed to occur in only one per cent of the appropriate
situations, the fact that this disinterested person has said he "knows"
that the rule was not obeyed would tend to show that this was
that one time. After all, it cannot properly be argued that in this
case there is a ninety-nine to one chance that this disinterested
person is lying. In other words, once there is positive proof that
the rule was not complied with, our assumed odds lose much of
their meaning, especially when a disinterested person is contra-
dicting the inference of obedience.
Remember also that if the rule is a safety rule, it has been
partially designed to prevent accidents such as the one which has
in fact taken place, so that if the rule had been complied with there
would have been less chance for the accident to happen. The mere
happening of the accident now becomes an indication that the rule
was disobeyed, and the chances are no longer ninety-nine to one
that there was obedience. This is particularly true when a rule
by its nature is such that compliance would tend to prevent ac-
cidents regardless of the negligence of others. For example, if a
streetcar company had a rule requiring the conductor to precede
his car into a blind intersection to make sure that it was clear
before signaling the motorman to proceed, and if a streetcar hit
an automobile at this place, violation of the rule would seem
likely unless the conductor himself acted unwisely.
Nevertheless, it is still sufficiently difficult to analyze the
probability that the rule was disobeyed on this one occasion to be
able to say that the possibilities have been so diminished as to
eliminate all probative value which might obtain from admitting
the rule. The adoption of a "no eye witness rule" in this area would
be a solution. To a certain extent the same could be said when
only the plaintiff and the defendant testify. But the value of the
rule in proving what actually happened remains highly question-
able since there is available other competent evidence based upon
the happening of an accident which obedience to the rule .would
have tended to prevent.
An interesting problem could arise, and has in fact been noted
in one jurisdiction, when the defendant first seeks to prove what
happened by the use of a rule and then seeks to use the same rule
as evidence of due care. The court noted that such a course would
allow a defendant to use the rule to relieve himself completely
of liability by thus offering two possible inferences: that he
obeyed the rule, and that obedience was reasonable. The court
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
then rejected this as an attempt by the defendant to pull himself
up by his own "bootstraps."' 35
IX. THE SERVANT V. MASTER CASES
While the case law concerning applicability of company rules
in actions by employees against their employers may be more
voluminous than that involving third persons, such cases may safely
be relegated to a relatively unimportant position in this article
because much of what has already been said is equally applicable
to them, because workmen's compensation and fellow servant rules
minimize the aspect of negligence and because the various courts
are in much greater accord in this area.136 Needless to say, work-
men's compensation is excluded from our consideration because
negligence of either the claimant or his employer is usually not in
issue.' 37
In a typical case the employee who is seeking to recover from
his employer for injuries suffered while at work has himself
violated a company rule, and this violation has in some way con-
tributed to the injury. Where contributory negligence is in issue,
the federal rule under the Federal Employees Liability Act and
the Safety Appliance Act,138 and the nearly unanimous rule in
the state courts, relieve the employer in whole or in part from
liability. The prior discussion of the effect of violating a known
rule when contributory negligence is in issue is equally applicable
here, with the added reason that the employee has violated his
contractual duty to his employer.139 The duty is absent when the
employee does not know of the rules through no fault of his own.
13" Anastasio v. Hedges, 207 App. Div. 106, 202 N.Y.S. 109 (1923).
136 Because of the greater harmony in this area, no attempt has been
made to exhaust the authorities. However, the general statements
in this section of the article can be found historically supported in the
following. BAILEY, MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO SER-
VANT, 71 (1894); DRESSER, THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACTS,
310, 316, 521, 522 (1903); ELLIOTT, RAILROADS, §§ 1280, 1282, 1643,
1696 (2d ed. 1907); 3 LABOTT'S MASTER AND SERVANT, §§ 909,
1114, 1115, 1119, 1120, 1268, 1281-84 (2d ed. 1913); 4 THOMPSON,
NEGLIGENCE, § 4135 et seq. (1904).
137 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 2 (1952).
138 See 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, notes 469-70, 1038; 45 U.S.C.A. 53 note 62,
45 F.C.A. § 51 notes 173, 259 & 284; 45 F.C.A. § 53 notes 14 to 17.
139 This proposition can be found supported in any of the articles in
note 136 supra.
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When a particular rule is unreasonable as a matter of law, the
rule and its violation are irrelevant to the issue of contributory
negligence. This often is the holding when compliance would be
an unreasonable obstacle to the performance of normal duties.
However, when a rule is shown to be habitually breached and the
employer knows it, or the breach is so notorious that he should
know of it, acquiescence in the breach is considered as amounting
to a waiver by the employer or an admission that compliance with
the rule was not feasible. Again this makes the rule irrelevant to
the contributory negligence issue. In addition, when a rule is
known by the employee, such knowledge can be considered as
knowledge of danger so that any violation of the rule amounts
to an assumption of the risks incidental thereto, a theory which
is no different in its ultimate effect from that of contributory
negligence.
Whenever an employee is injured by reason of his employer's
direct or indirect violation of a rule, the rule is usually considered
admissible with the same general limitations as have been discussed
elsewhere, unless the fellow-servant rule is applicable. Here, too,
the analysis is the same as that which has been applied to third-
party cases, with the added argument that the employer has a
contractual duty to make and enforce adequate rules for the pro-
tection of his employees. The use of the rule as evidence by the
employee is also even more appropriate since it is reasonable to
assume in most cases, especially where the employee has been
on the job for some time, that he either knows of the rule itself,
or is aware of its results. It would thus seem that reliance upon
the rule can be assumed.
X. CONCLUSION
Obviously any necessity that a court analyze every attempt to
introduce company rules in all the circumstances considered by
this article would place a heavy burden on that court when taken
together with the numerous other more difficult, and perhaps more
important, problems which the litigation may involve. The dis-
tinctions between the employee and the employer defendant, be-
tween an admission and a circumstance, and between the adoption
of a rule and its continuing existence, could easily be lost by the
court and the jury among the multitude of other problems involved,
especially if specific instructions were necessary to point up such
distinctions. Yet a consideration of all these factors has led to a
general value judgment that the rules are, within prescribed limits,
of material evidentiary value in most cases. For this reason it is
appropriate to adopt a few general rules, limited only where ab-
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solutely necessary, to encompass the entire area insofar as possible.
Such an attempt follows:
I. On the issue of the negligence of the defendant employee
or the employer's liability therefor, a written safety rule in exist-
ence at the time of the accident should be admitted into evidence
without binding effect as a fact for the consideration of the jury
provided that the following conditions are satisfied: the rule per-
tains to the situation in which the accident happened; the rule
was intended to protect the injured person from the harm which
he suffered; the rule was violated; and the violation contributed
to the injury. If the rule involves a course of conduct which falls
above or below that which a reasonable man would consider proper
under the circumstances, it would be irrelevant.
II. On the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, the
same type of rule is admissible as evidence for a defendant if: the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the rule; the plaintiff
violated it; and the violation contributed to the injury, unless the
defendant has so habitually permitted the violation of the rule
as to have waived it.
III. The plaintiff can introduce the same kind of rule as
evidence that he was justified in relying upon it and was thus free
of contributory negligence by showing that he knew of it.
IV. A rule is not admissible on behalf of the defendant or the
plaintiff to show what actually was done on the occasion in ques-
tion, although either may do so when there is no eyewitness.
V. A rule may not be introduced by the defendant as evidence
that acts in compliance with the rule were reasonable.
VI. When knowledge of danger and feasibility of safeguards
are in issue, they may be evidenced by the same type of rule as
in paragraph I. above.
We may conclude that although the evidentiary value of com-
pany safety rules has not received as much attention as statutes,
custom or habit, there is ever increasing likelihood that they may
be involved in a tort action. The increasing size and complexity
of our industrial institutions demands that safety rules be seen by
counsel in their proper perspective as evidence. If the admissibil-
ity of such rules is limited in the manner suggested by this article,
they may serve as useful tools for the resolution of legal contro-
versy.
